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In Egypt, opposition groups challenged the Mubarak Regime and toppled it. More than 
two years later, demonstrators against the military-backed government that deposed 
President Morsi were brutally put down and rule stayed with the junta.  
This thesis examines those events in Egypt and focuses on opposition tactics used 
and the response elicited from security force elements. It seeks to discover where, in 
2011, security forces were not given or disobeyed the order to shoot protestors and, in 
2013, ruthlessly followed that order. This thesis analyzes opposition tactics and questions 
whether those actions elicited loyalty shifts within security forces and how any such 
shifts impacted the ability to achieve political change.  
The thesis uses a synthesis of objectives developed by Anika Binnendijk, labeled 
the “Five Strategic Objective” framework, along with social movement theory as they 
apply it to challenger actions. To these the author adds foreign involvement and internal 
dynamics. Data is gathered through in-depth review of relevant documentation: published 
news, discussions, books, and reputable web sources. Analysis of the sources shows that 
in 2011, a broad based appeal generated sympathy within security forces that precluded 
obeying a shoot order and that such sympathy was not present in 2013. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PRIMARY PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to review opposition tactics used in Egypt in 2011 
and 2013. Specifically, this study will focus on security force allegiance shifts and their 
effect on the trajectory of security force actions during the political movement. This 
thesis will analyze opposition actions and question whether they elicited loyalty shifts 
within the security forces and regime loyalists and how any such shifts impacted the 
overall success or failure to achieve a defined political change.  
The thesis uses a synthesis of the “Five Strategic Objective” framework, 
oppositional objectives proposed by Anika Binnendijk in 2009, along with Social 
Movement Theory (SMT), foreign involvement and internal dynamics as they apply to 
challenger actions in 2011 and again in 2013.1  The events in Egypt are reviewed apropos 
of these theoretical frameworks. Within these cases, the author examines the 
interrelationships between regime supporters and dissidents regarding actions that exhibit 
an effort to influence loyalty. Elements that impact decision-making include: legitimacy, 
repression, social networks, perception and will be factored into this study to establish if 
Binnendijk’s framework can be applied to this scenario. Further, the thesis looks at how 
any transfer of allegiance generated violence, and at power shifts that occurred (if any) 
within the uprising and overall outcome of the movement.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The events of 2011 and 2013 happened as a result of multiple factors over an 
extended time. The 2011 uprisings galvanized a region, creating a popular movement that 
forced many leaders to abdicate or institute more democratic policies while others 
weathered the storm for another day. Security force response varied across the region: 
some did nothing, others initially supported the regime and shifted to the opposition later, 
and still others staunchly supported the establishment. For example, often security forces 
                                                 
1 Anika Locke Binnendijk, “Holding Fire: Security Force Allegiance during Nonviolent Uprisings” 
(PhD diss., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2009). 
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within a country conducted different actions. Police dealt with the protestors while the 
military took no action. What explains the variable behaviors of security forces and is 
there a relationship between opposition tactics and security force actions?  
This thesis seeks to better understand the relation between opposition force 
actions and security force responses within the context of the Arab Spring, focusing on 
loyalty shifts. A review of tactics used by the opposition to influence security force 
loyalty is less common; those that do, focus on the Color Revolutions of Eastern Europe.2 
This thesis will review opposition tactics used in Egypt that can be argued as further 
progressions of the events in Eastern Europe. The study will contribute to the 
understanding of the effect of position tactics on security force allegiance shifts and the 
resulting effect security force response has on the movement. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Analyses of the Arab uprisings, though common, have rarely addressed the tactics 
regime challengers used to affect security force opinion and loyalty. For example, how to 
explain loyalty shifts of authoritarian regime supporters and militaries during the Arab 
Spring? What explains the success of some protests when others failed? In what 
particular ways, if any, did the security forces change sides? These issues are crucial to 
understanding regime change, the success or failure of national protests, and the decision-
making process of the security forces. Yet, these questions have not been addressed. 
This thesis does not concern itself with current conditions and situations in each 
of the referenced three cases; success is defined as in terms of whether the uprising 
effected a regime change or met its goal. The purpose of this document is to delve into 
the tactics used by the opposition that caused loyalty shifts, compare them to tactics 
found to Anika Binnendijk’s framework, and correlate overall success of the uprising 
with success of the movement to shift security force loyalty.  
                                                 
2 Zoltan Barany, “Armies and Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2 (2013): 62–76; Eva 
Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 142–145; Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 17. 
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The hypothesis of the thesis is that challenger tactics (strict nonviolence, positive 
interactions with the security forces and efforts to delegitimize) had a direct impact on 
security force loyalty, causing shifts over time. Anika Binnendijk’s framework 
establishes an effective series of objectives for regime opposition in order to focus 
limited resources intended to hobble coercive elements of the regime.3  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will be organized around a historical case study of two events in recent 
Egyptian history. The paper will review the context and background of each case study in 
order to process their similarities and differences in how uprising participants affected the 
allegiance of security forces. In each of the cases, security forces met an opposition group 
that was challenging the established regime in an effort to gain “freedom, justice, honor, 
and human dignity,” in a predominantly nonviolent way; yet, each case had a different 
outcome.4 This study will use Anika Binnendijk’s doctoral dissertation which outlines a 
five step framework that nonviolent challengers to authoritarian regimes can use. She 
states that challengers, “are more likely to achieve security force loyalty shifts” if they 
can accomplish these objectives: 
Expose regime legitimacy: by exploiting regime blunders and by 
communicating distinctions between loyalty to country and regime; 
Establish challenger legitimacy: by reaching out to security forces’ 
communities, by seeking certification of influential allies, by explicitly 
committing to nonviolent practices, and by garnering diverse appeal; 
Raise the costs of repression: by identifying communities and external 
actors able to impose sanctions, by communication effectively about 
incidents of repression, and by avoiding potential pretexts for repression; 
Mitigate costs of accommodation: by addressing short term concerns 
about personal safety and long term concerns about professional security; 
                                                 
3 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59. 
4 Asmaa Mahfouz, “ Meet Asmaa Mahfouz and the vlog that Helped Spark the Revolution,” trans. 
Iyad el-Baghadadi, YouTube, 18 January 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk. 
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Demonstrate likelihood of success: by exhibiting internal unity, building 
active participation of broad based alliances, creating localized 
asymmetries, and exploiting security force cleavages.5 
With the addition of gaining foreign support and managing internal group dynamics and 
by accomplishing these objectives, opposition elements can increase their probability of 
security force loyalty shifts that can be used against the incumbent regime and enhancing 
overall success of the movement. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Over the course of the Arab Spring there were countries in which hundreds of 
thousands of people gathered on the streets to protest various issues with the regimes. In 
some countries, security elements fired live rounds into the crowds while other elements 
within the same country did nothing. Opposition forces engaged regime support with 
predominantly nonviolent tactics and in some cases influenced regime supporters to shift 
loyalty to their side. 
This thesis begins by examining the Egyptian uprising of 2011.It will provide 
history and context to the uprising that had roots in the 2004 Kifaya (Enough) 
movement.6 Review of key groups that impacted the 2011 uprising, including foreign 
contacts, training, education, and tactics used in the execution phase of the 18-day revolt 
will be compared with the objectives Anika Binnendijk concluded are instrumental to 
create cleavages and influence loyalty shifts in security forces.7 Analysis will be 
presented describing how the events of the Arab uprisings compared to or were 
influenced by elements of Binnendijk’s framework.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59. 
6 Emad el-Din Shahin, “The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the Spirit of 
Tahrir Square,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 1 (2012): 49, 52–53. 
7 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59. 
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In conclusion, this thesis will compare and contrast the significant events and 
tactics highlighting any major contributing factors that may have had an impact on the 
outcome of the uprisings. Each of these countries had very different results to their 
particular situations. Security force responses led to different actions and outcomes. 
Analysis will compare how, if at all, the security force posture and response to opposition 
tactics affected the trajectory of an uprising.   
 6
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this review is to analyze the impact of security force allegiance 
shifts on the trajectories of the uprisings in Egypt in two separate events. The literature 
review begins with research on the importance of security forces within a regime as a 
defender of government and protector of the state. The review continues with scholarly 
discourse from numerous disciplines on rational choice, frames, legitimacy and 
nonviolence and their potential impact on maintaining allegiance. 
A. SECURITY FORCES 
The governments of the world rely on the ability of their security forces to 
maintain order, defend the nation against foreign aggressors, and protect the civilian 
population; in authoritarian regimes, these roles can often take a backseat to protecting 
the government. Security forces are considered one, if not the main foundation, of state 
power.8 Loyalty of these forces is a primary concern to any government, but of particular 
importance to states that resort to repression, sometimes violent, to control their 
population.9 Security forces play an important role in the negative sanctions used to 
subdue opposition groups, by maintaining stability and securing the government from 
internal threat. Anika Binnendijk asserts states that use coercion are more susceptible to 
the loss security allegiance. Vladimir Lenin recognized the importance of security force 
loyalty commenting that some security forces are required for revolution to “triumph.”10 
How can this important tool of an authoritative regime be repurposed? Gene Sharp and 
Robert Helvey ask government challengers to evaluate the regime’s “pillars of support,” 
                                                 
8 Risa A. Brooks, Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks 
and Elizabeth A. Stanley (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 3.  
9 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People in Power Movements in Nondemocracies, vol. 22 of 
Social Movements, Protests, and Contention (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 78–79, 115–117. 
Schock describes uprisings in the Philippines and Burma. In the Philippines there developed a cleavage in 
the military that produced a mutiny, and while the number of military that shifted loyalty was only about 
two battalions, it provided a focus for civil discontent. Conversely in Burma, united military forces 
effectively used coercive techniques to end any potential regime change.  
10 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 1; Cited by D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A 
Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa, (London: 
Academic Press, 1974), 3. 
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specifically the military, to “induce disobedience.”11 Binnendijk proposes a novel 
framework that, if challengers can accomplish, will bring about the desired allegiance 
transfer opposition forces need to secure success.12 
Security forces are indoctrinated in government mantra, incorporated as part of a 
rigorously controlled hierarchy and loyalty is a major focus of the training. Loyalty as 
defined by Merriam-Webster is “unswerving in allegiance, faithful in allegiance to one’s 
lawful sovereign or government.”13 The decision to shift loyalty is difficult within these 
conservative, state centered organizations, and involves elements of decision making, 
legitimacy, and framing to influence potential shifts. 
B. RATIONAL CHOICE 
Decision-making is a well-studied area of social science and required when 
choosing to stay with the current regime or not. Adam Smith articulated an economic 
model that can be applied to human behavior. It is founded on the precept that humans 
are self-interested, an inherent trait of human nature; elements of rational choice theory 
developed from this initial frame. Rational choice theory argues “rational individuals will 
compare the benefits and costs of participation with those of inactivity, and choose the 
best course of action in which their expected utility is maximized.”14 Muller and Opp 
address the effects of rational choice on collective action, private interest theory versus 
public good. Private interest theory postulates personnel incentives such as power or 
money can influence a rational actor into rebellious activity.15 Catharine Zuckert points 
out rational choice adherents evaluate actors without acknowledging social influence.16 
                                                 
11 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation, (Boston: 
Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 63; Robert Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the 
Fundamentals, (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 8–9. 
12 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59. 
13 Merriam-Webster, Online ed., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loyalty, s.v. “Loyalty.” 
14 Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,” 
American Political Science Review 80, no. 2 (1986): 471; Kristen Renwick Monroe and Kristen Hall 
Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” Political Psychology 16, no. 1 (1995): 2, 7. 
15 Muller and Opp, “Rebellious Collective Action,” 472. 
16 Catharine H. Zuckert, “On the ‘Rationality’ of Rational Choice,” Political Psychology 16, no. 1 
(1995): 180. 
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In an effort to address this deficiency, Gordon Tullock incorporated a variable for 
“entertainment value” and Morris Silver further expanded the list of incentives by adding 
a “psychic income” variable; this element includes feelings such as duty, ethnicity, 
religious motivations and “taste for conspiracy, violence, and adventure.”17 These 
arguments fail to compensate for those individuals that do nothing yet benefit from the 
effects of success, the “free rider” effect. Muller and Opp introduce public goods theory 
that adds collective identity and social influence into an individual’s decision to rebel. 
They found public goods incentives have greater impact than private interest incentives 
when deciding to participate in rebellious collective action.18 This illustrates the impact 
of the greater collective good, valued at times above an actor’s self-interest, which gained 
ground through the 1990s with a variety of studies and suggests the limits of the private 
interest argument.19  
Rational choice is based in either economic or political theory and heavily reliant 
on the concept of a rational actor. The actor has ordinal preferences and goals; the actor 
shapes actions toward the most efficient way of obtaining desired preferences and 
goals.20 The difference between the two schools is the end-state, in economic theory all 
participants win, in political theory there are losers.21 Utility theory of the rational choice 
model breaks decisions into cost benefit of use, in which “utility is a measure on 
preference” and a way to refine preference order.22 Forecasting decisions with utility 
theory requires factoring in probabilities of occurrence to each variable; debate remains 
whether rational actors maximize utility or minimize regret in utility theory.23  
                                                 
17 Gordon Tullock, “The Paradox of Revolution,” Public Choice 11, (1971): 91–91; Morris Silver, 
“Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic Approach,” Public Choice 17 (1974): 64–65.  
18 Muller and Opp, “Rebellious Collective Action,” 484–484. 
19 Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 4–5. 
20 Zuckert, “‘Rationality’ of Rational Choice,” 181. 
21 William H. Riker, “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice,” Political Psychology 16, no. 1 
(1995): 24. 
22 Riker, “Political Psychology,” 28–29. 
23 Riker, “Political Psychology,” 30; Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 
7–9. 
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Developing as a response to utility theory, prospect theory focuses on risk 
avoidance rather than asset gain or loss. Actors form decisions around a known point of 
reference and results are changes from that point.24 Actors find it easier to accept risk in 
losses and tend to avoid risk when there is a possibility to gain; how a problem is framed 
is a critical consideration to the final decision. Utility theory neglects moral desires where 
the actor feels an innate drive (absent pleasure) to behave in a particular manner which is 
difficult to fit into a self-interest niche.  
Utility theory’s rationale removes feeling from the decision making process. It is 
a limitation that is generally atypical of how real people work.25 Altruism counters the 
assumption that actors are motivated to obtain personal goals. Monroe illustrates this 
potentially dangerous course of action when discussing altruists saving Jews in Nazi 
Germany.26 Often, actors make decisions counter to self-interest, reaffirming research 
from Muller and Opp; utility theory has a difficult time explaining this.27 The 
ambivalence model is another enigma of rational choice. Monroe presents Johnston’s 
example of a new mother deciding between going to work and staying with the newborn 
and the perceived equivocal impacts of either choice.28 This theory also adds the 
emotional implications that a strict interpretation of rational choice allows.  
Perception bias is another cognitive process that shapes an actor’s decision. 
Robert Jervis discusses how exposure and experience create preconceived notions, and 
actors tend “to see what they expect to see.”29 As people grow, their experience, 
education, and social effects such as bandwagoning unite to create preconceived notions 
or expectations that are carried and incorporated into decision making. Once created, 
                                                 
24 Jack S. Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992): 171–72. 
25 Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 8. 
26 Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 9. 
27 Muller and Opp, “Rebellious Collective Action,” 484–485; Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and 
Rational Actor Theory,” 9. 
28 David Johnston, The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of 
Rational Action, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe (New York: HarperCollins 1991) cited in Kristen Renwick 
Monroe and Kristen Hall Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” Political Psychology 16, no. 1 
(1995): 10–11. 
29 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 117. 
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preconceived notions become expectations that are very difficult for an actor to shed, no 
matter the veracity of evidence presented to counter the notion.30 The resilient nature of 
preconceived notions forces regime challengers into a long term campaign for the hearts 
and minds of security forces.   
C. FRAMES 
James Druckman describes frames in communication and thought explaining how 
communication shapes the ways people think and perceive an argument or event, 
resulting in a positive or negative response.31 He elaborates on the framing effect 
showing how equivalency framing and emphasis framing, through use of symbols and 
words, can alter how citizens understand the world around them.32 People reevaluate risk 
and alter decisions placing emphasis on factors established by those shaping the frames.33 
Druckman elaborates by describing the impact of wording in survey questions. 
Respondents to a survey on free speech reported “48% of Americans would ‘not allow’ 
Communist…speech, while… 22% would ‘forbid’” Communist speech.34 The difference 
highlights the effects of word placement, even though the key terms in the question are 
equally defined. Experiments by Beneditto De Martino, Dharshan Kumaran and 
Raymond Dolan further develop this effect, showing how decisions change based on 
framing; people “tended to choose the sure option over the gamble option” in the Gain 
frame of reference and were “risk-seeking in the Loss frame.”35 Jillian Schwedler shows 
how cultural and nationalistic actions created meaning for security forces in the 1997 
anti-trade fair demonstrations in Jordan. The Committee, demonstration organizers, used 
frames that appealed to a broad base of people, incorporating “cultural practices” and 
                                                 
30 Jervis, Perception, 145–147. 
31 James N. Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,” Political 
Behavior 23, no. 3 (2001): 227–28. 
32 Druckman, “Implications of Framing,” 228. 
33 Ibid.,” 228–30.  
34 Druckman, “Implications of Framing,” 230. 
35 Beneditto De Martino, Dharshan Kumaran and Raymond Dolan, “Frames, Biases, and Rational 
Decision Making in the Human Brain,” Science 313, no. 5787 (2006): 684–85. 
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symbols with shared meaning.36 The demonstration slogans and chants surmounted the 
riot police’s anti-demonstration role and appealed directly to their nationalistic identity, 
culminating to a point where the police broke out in song and dance.37  
D. LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy is a form of political support based in the common perception of 
subjects or citizens and can be derived from numerous variables. A traditional form of 
legitimacy, still in use today, is based on repression and bribery; the Arab Uprisings were 
a direct response to the use of those autocratic tools against a people lacking “freedom, 
justice, honor, and human dignity.”38 Through globalization and social interconnectivity, 
the idea of a social contract with legitimacy, based on a constitution is becoming 
ubiquitous.39 Bruce Gilley believes that a state becomes more legitimate as its population 
sees it as “rightfully” holding and exercising power where “rightfully is the central 
conceptual challenge.”40 Ted Gurr and Clark McPhail argue the importance of relative 
deprivation claiming it as a requirement for any form of social strife.41 An offshoot of 
this theory explores the impact of economic growth on a population, illustrating a relation 
between positive rates of growth with increased regime loyalty.42 More recent studies 
into the factors of legitimacy explore social trust, pride, political attitudes, and 
government performance as less material factors leading to a more emotive, arguably 
stronger feeling of legitimacy and loyalty.43 Binnendijk postulates that legitimacy is one 
                                                 
36 Jillian Schwedler, “Cop Rock: Protest, Identity, and Dancing Riot Police in Jordan,” Social 
Movement Studies 4, no. 2 (2005): 168. 
37 Schwedler, “Cop Rock,” 155, 171. 
38 Mahfouz, “ Meet Asmaa Mahfouz;” “Saudi Arabia: Time for the Old Men to Give Way,” The 
Economist, accessed 23 June 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557330. 
39 Sofia Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” Political Theory 35, no. 5 (2007): 624. 
40 Bruce Gilley, “The Determinates of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” International 
Political Science Review, 27, no. 1 (2006): 48. 
41 Clark McPhail, “Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research,” 
American Sociological Review 36, no. 6 (1971): 1058; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Colorado: 
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of a set of critical pillars authoritarian regimes use to maintain control of the population 
and is a foundation for the loyalty of security forces. The “ability to wield tactics to 
expose the illegitimacy of the incumbent regime is likely to aid a challenger in inducing 
security force loyalty shifts.”44  
Stanley Milgram’s experiments vividly show the influence of a perceived 
authority figure on a naïve “teacher” who has transferred any culpability to the 
experimenter.45 The human desire to please is a powerful incentive that facilitates 
compliance and increases the propensity to act in extreme and fatal ways, so any attempt 
to co-opt security forces will be one of effort and many years.46 In Tsarist Russia of 1905, 
a persistent general condition of military failure, economic malaise, and repression 
caused military elements to fraternize with opposition forces, and in one case, halt 
training until opposition members were released from prison.47 Learning from mistakes 
in the failed uprisings in Serbia in the late 1990s, OTPOR began a nonviolent campaign 
to humble the Milosevic government, co-opting rhetoric and routinely capitalizing on 
regime gaffes while exposing malfeasance. Through this lengthy crusade, a small group 
of government opposition accentuated a weakness of the regime to effectively de-
legitimate the authority and increasing the rate of security force loyalty shifts.48 Similar 
tactics were used by PORA, a Ukrainian youth group that achieved regime changing 
results like Serbia.49  
                                                 
44 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 30–39. 
45 Stanely Milgram, “The Dilemma of Obedience,” The Phi Delta Kappan 55, no. 9 (1974): 605. 
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47 Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict, (New 
York: Palgrave, 2000), 28–31. 
48 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 485–88; Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 72–85; Anika 
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Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004),” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, (2006): 
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49 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 157–159. As in Serbia, a Ukrainian youth organization took the 
Ukrainian word Пора! or “its time” as their name.  
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E. NONVIOLENCE 
The perception that violent strategies are a more effective means of resistance 
than nonviolent means is prevalent, but nonviolent action has developed into a potent 
method of taking power from a repressive regime.50 Ackerman and Duvall argue that a 
number of conflicts over the course of the twentieth century have used nonviolence as a 
“decisive mode of engagement” to shape the future of a contested state.51 The prolonged 
use of nonviolent techniques in South Africa successfully lifted apartheid in 1994; Serbia 
and Ukraine effectively removed their leaders in 2000 and 2004 respectfully.52 Security 
force loyalty shifts are a great aid to government challengers. Many scholars claim that 
challengers cannot win without support of “at least part of the old regime’s” security 
elements.53  
Coercive sanctions are a primary way authoritarian regimes engage uprisings, and 
nonviolent tactics interfere with the state’s ability to employ those sanctions. Violent 
tactics force security forces into a survival mentality. The opposition is viewed as an 
enemy, and security forces are drilled on how to deal with the enemy. Nonviolent tactics 
attempt to remove the perception of threat; opposition elements hug and kiss security 
forces and apply universal unity symbols creating the potential for repressive tactics to 
undermine the legitimacy of the government the techniques are employed to protect.54 
Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth argue loyalty shifts are more likely when regime 
and security force members do not feel threatened. This feeling of reduced physical threat 
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reduces the risk associated with government and security members shifting allegiance.55 
“When the regime can no longer rely on the cooperation of its security forces…its grip on 
power is undermined.”56  
Violent attacks against disciplined nonviolent protestors are more likely to cause a 
phenomenon that Sharp calls “political jiu-jitsu.”57 The paradox of repression is that it is 
intended to subdue any mobilization of the public against the leaders’ agenda; repressive 
tactics against a nonviolent group can back-fire on the government and drive the 
population to mobilize even more.58 Coercive tactics on nonviolent groups can be framed 
in a way to delegitimize the government and push security elements toward the 
opposition. Methods of insubordination may be subtle, but once started, they are hard to 
eliminate. Violent tactics do not engender the same response from security elements.59 
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56 Ibid., 13. 
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III. “ARAB SPRING” OF 2011 
In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak was removed from power, his son lost the opportunity 
of succeeding his father as president, and a new leadership took control of Egypt. 
Ministry heads were forced from office; some were arrested, others went into exile. The 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took charge of running the country. While 
some may argue that the military had been running the country since the coup of 1952, 
which is considered an argument for another study to address. 
A. EIGHTEEN DAYS 
Over eighteen days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered in city squares 
throughout the country. In Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Mansura, Beni Suef and Aswan. 
People from all strata of Egyptian society gathered to contest the regime and its policies, 
most publically in Tahrir Square in Cairo. The people of Egypt have protested the 
government in the past. In April 2008, textile workers in Mahalla protested poor wages 
and rising food prices. The 1977 Bread Riots were a response to Anwar Sadat’s economic 
“opening” which cut off subsidies. Each of these failed to make substantive gains.  
What made the uprising in 2011 successful? In the past, typical regime response 
to protests had been excessive repressive tactics that used brute force to crush any 
mobilization combined with an opening of public space, bribes, and popular elections to 
allow the perception of popular approval and provide a relief valve for the people, a 
release that allowed the perception of popular voice without allowing for change, The 
uprising of 2011, however, changed popular mobilization across the region.  
Coined the Arab Spring by some and The Rosetta Revolution by others, “the 
protest—dubbed a ‘day of revolution against torture, poverty corruption and 
unemployment’” began peacefully on the morning of 25 January 2011. As the day 
progressed, the repressive state security tactics of the past gradually occurred.60 But this 
                                                 
60 “Egypt Protesters Clash with Police,” Al-Jazeera, 25 January 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112511362207742.html; Ahmed S. Hashim, “The 
Egyptian Military Part Two: From Mubarak Onward,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011.): 115.  
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time, the regime’s coercive tactics backfired, serving to strengthen the movement in what 
Gene Sharp called “Political jiu-jitsu.”61 The tens of people starting grew to hundreds, the 
hundreds grew to thousands, and again to hundreds of thousands; what caused this 
difference?  
The uprisings of 2011 will continue to be chronicled and investigated by scholars 
and journalists across the world. With the notable exception of a few, such as Amy 
Austin Holmes, Mona el-Ghobashy and Emad el-Din Shahin, very little has been directed 
at tactics used by the opposition and their effects on the repressive techniques 
traditionally employed by the state.62 This chapter surveys the actions of the state 
security apparatus, specifically the Interior Ministry and the Egyptian military, and their 
response to opposition tactics. It will then apply Anika Binnendijk’s framework as it 
applies in Egypt and the Middle East and North Aferica (MENA) region.63  
Analysis of the interaction between actors over the eighteen-day period along 
with external events (United States pressure and perceived success of the Tunisian 
revolution) show that while the opposition did incorporate tactics to maintain a positive 
relationship with the military, the other government agencies had a history of abusive 
tactics that alienated the people and served to negatively impact the stability of the 
Mubarak regime.  
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B. SECURITY FORCES: BACKGROUND  
The modern era began with the “French withdrawal in 1801” and subsequent 
consolidation of power by Muhammad Ali in 1805.64 Adopting lessons learned from 
Egypt’s interaction with European powers, Muhammad Ali worked to improve military 
capability and realized a better education system and economy was required.65 He built a 
national bureaucracy around the “defensive modernization” of the military, creating the 
foundations of today’s Egyptian state.66 When Major General Mohamed Naguib, Colonel 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and eighty other Free Officers deposed the British puppet King 
Faruq and sent him to the French Riviera in 1952, the line of Muhammad Ali ended. 
Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) immediately began to 
consolidate power, alienating members of the old regime from positions of authority; 
potential regime competitors were reassigned or suffered convenient “accidents,” even 
from within the ranks of the Free Officers.67 The eventual power of the interior ministry 
developed from a disagreement in goals; Naguib wanted the military to get out of 
politics, and “‘leave it to the politicians.’” Nasser believed the military needed to stay in 
politics to keep the “‘divisive group of stranglers’ of old elite” out and to reshape 
Egyptian centers of power.68  
                                                 
64 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 
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68 Abd al-Nasser, Wathaiq Thawrat Yulyu [The July Revolution Documents] (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal  
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1. Ministry of Defense 
The military is the most respected institution in Egypt. Arguments can be made 
that the military has been involved in politics since the 1880’s and was the pivotal 
influence in the Revolution of 1952.69 Until the election of Mohammed Morsi in 2011, 
every president has been a military officer. Since the time of the Free Officers, the 
military has been perceived a defender of the state to be used to restore order, improve 
the economy, expel the invader, to make life better for all Egyptians and act as a 
challenge to the president. As the primary fixture of violence in the country, it was the 
only institution that was able to challenge the presidency and, as such, was a threat to the 
regime. Since the time of Nasser, the responsibilities of running the government, securing 
the government and controlling the officers has been separated between the political elite. 
The Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defense have competed for political 
supremacy, and the Ministry of Defense, while still a powerful force, has been on the 
losing end, but never removed from the triad.70  
Egypt is divided into four military districts: north, south, west, and central, each 
with a military headquarters and units. The Second Field Army, Third Field Army, and 
the Operations Authority have additional headquarters locations that, when combined 
with district elements, effectively cover the country.71 Morale is good; a study was 
conducted after Hosni Mubarak took office to determine how to best insulate the military 
from religious extremists and resulted in a general increase in living standards and 
education for even the lowest ranking members. Conscripted forces are paid four times as 
much as their Interior Ministry counterparts with a service obligation of 18 to 36 
months.72 In 2011, there were 468,500 active duty Army, Navy, Air Defense service 
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members with an additional 479,000 reservists on the rolls; 280,000 to 340,000 of the 
active duty members are conscripted.73 Equipment runs the gamut of traditional military 
weapons systems such as the M1A1 Abrams tank, licensed to be built in Egypt; F-16 
Fighting Falcons, and assorted artillery pieces, along with surface and sub-surface Naval 
and Coast Guard units.74  
The intelligence arm, falling under the loose purview of the Ministry of Defense, 
is the Mukhabarat al-Ammah. The Mukhabarat al-Ammah or General Intelligence 
Service (GIS) reports directly to the president and was designed after the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency. It is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all Egypt’s 
intelligence departments, both internally and externally focused; the number of 
intelligence personnel is a state secret.75 Its members are considered the “premier 
intelligence agency, and…scarcely concealed their contempt for their colleagues in the 
Ministry of Interior.”76  
In Egypt, the army is “the ultimate guarantor of the regime’s safety” as put forth 
in the 1971 Constitution to defend national territory “in accordance with the instructions 
of the President of the Republic…the commander-in-chief of the armed forces” and has 
been called to do so on numerous occasions.77 The Egyptian military is no stranger to the 
use of internal suppression and coercive tactics. One of the first uses of this was on 
August 12, 1952 in Kafra al-Dawr, a center of textile manufacturing. Workers protested 
seeking better pay and work conditions and a live round was fired, injuring military 
personnel. The regime responded quickly, executing two workers with communist 
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tendencies.78 In 1977, President Anwar Sadat began a policy of economically opening 
Egypt to the West which led to mandatory subsidy reductions on cooking fuel, rice, bread 
and other basic goods. As a result, thousands took to the streets in what became known as 
the Bread Riots. The army was ordered to contain the situation after the Interior 
Ministry’s forces failed; army intervention killed 160 and wounded 800.79 Sadat viewed  
this instance of saving the regime as a threat, and he began strengthening the Interior 
Ministry CSF and focusing the army on exterior threats.80 Under Mr. Mubarak, the 
military became less active with riot control duties, focusing on building a vast military 
industrial complex that is estimated to account for ten to fifteen percent of the nation’s 
U.S.$210 billion economy, helping to sustain higher standards of living and loyalty.81 
Even with the shift in focus, the military remained the institution the regime calls to 
restore order. In February 1986, it was assigned that task again. Central Security Force 
conscripts rioted, 17,000 to 20,000 men protested low wages and a rumored year increase 
to their service obligations.82 President Mubarak called the army to enforce a three-day 
curfew; the second day saw 107 conscripts dead and 715 injured, proving the army’s 
ability and discipline. The army would not again be called to control any part of the 
population until January 2011.83  
2. Interior Ministry 
The Interior Ministry grew from the dual purpose of securing Egyptian public 
order and minimizing the military thereby redefining the state power structure and 
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securing the regime. Each president has had an impact on the ministry’s development. 
Nasser started the coup (or revolution) and shaped the forces, marginalizing any military 
elements that threatened the new regime.84 Anwar Sadat further reduced the influence of 
military officers in the cabinet reducing their number from a high of 65 percent under 
Nasser to 20 percent.85 The coup possibility created from the 1977 Bread Riots never 
materialized, but Sadat expanded the Central Security Forces by 200 percent and 
equipped it with tear gas, armored cars, and automatic weapons in an effort to keep a 
coup opportunity from happening again.86 Hosni Mubarak doubled his Interior Ministry 
coercive apparatus, and its various elements, outnumbering the Egyptian military more 
than three to one in 2011.87 Their authorities changed with amendments to “Law 109 (of 
1971) to 116 (of 1981) which altered language from ‘safeguarding public safety’ to 
‘public order,’” greatly expanding the ministry’s powers.88 
There are many agencies that form the Interior Ministry security force; they can 
be categorized under intelligence and force elements. The feared Mubahath el-Dawla or 
State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) is the internally focused security arm of 
information gatherers, intelligence providers, and interrogators formed out of the 
remnants of the king’s political police.89 The SSIS manages a nationwide system of 
surveillance “using both plainclothes agents and a network of informers,” often recruited 
after arrest or detainment.90 The force side of the Interior Ministry is the Central Security 
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Force (CSF), and was the primary known element confronting protestors in the 2011 
uprising.91  
 The CSF is equivalent to a light infantry force that is responsible for counter 
insurgency and is called upon when traditional police response is not effective at 
“dissuading” protestors.92 Initially created by Nasser in 1969, the CSF, also known as riot 
control, was to shift regime protection responsibilities from the politically marginalized 
military. Within a year, the CSF numbered 100,000 members.93 Presidents Sadat and 
Mubarak expanded the CSF manning to 300,000 and 325,000 conscripts respectfully; the 
majority are poorly paid, undereducated, minimally trained, low-ranking peasants turned 
down from the regular military, all having a three-year service obligation.94 Interior 
Minister Habib al-Adly (1997–2011) instituted a policy of selecting personnel that were 
not well educated “because they were not as easy to manipulate.”95 Conversely, the 
officers were the “cream of the crop,” chosen through a difficult acceptance protocol. 
Officer candidates were selected based on intelligence and aptitude test scores, physical 
standards, and the kashf al hay’a, or family and social specific assessments conducted by 
the SSIS. The officers were also paid poorly. However, this changed with increase in 
rank, due to compensation through public influence and increasing status and power.96 
The CSF is equipped with a variety of weapons: armored personnel carriers, water 
cannons, automatic weapons, tear gas, mortars and other riot control gear.97  
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The Interior Ministry, through time, has developed into the primary coercive tool 
used by an Egyptian authoritarian regime, no matter who is in charge. The SSIS is known 
and hated for its “harassment, incommunicado detention, interrogation and torture,” and a 
network of surveillance that reaches all aspects of life.98 State Security can detain and 
question on a whim and is well trained on torture techniques, ranging from physical 
electric shocks to psychological threats of sexual assault on the person or family.99 
Central security forces are the visible threat posed to Egyptians, often used to obstruct 
polling centers while overseeing ballot counting, ensuring that the regime maintained at 
least 75 percent of the popular vote.100 Riot and protest control was the primary mission 
of the Interior Ministry police and CSF, and they have a long history of successfully 
using coercive measures to control protestors. Labor and student protests in 1968 were 
violently suppressed with live ammunition, killing 21 and injuring 772.101 In 1984, 
declining real wages, subsidy reductions, and elimination of guaranteed employment 
caused workers in Kafr al-Dawar to riot. The CSF responded with tear gas and live 
ammunition, killing three and arresting 220.102 As economic pressure and abuses 
continued, strikes and protests became more prevalent with 86 occurring in 2003 and 
“over 700 in 2010.”103 An estimated two million people have taken part in strikes since 
2001, Protest experience was gathered over this period by a younger generation that “cut 
its teeth” on the use of technology in the modern world, providing ample training for 
what to expect and how to react to the CSF in the 2011 Uprising.104  
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C. SECURITY FORCE: RESPONSES 
This section details the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defense responses to 
opposition tactics. The opposition element in the Egyptian Arab Spring was made up of 
an association of various youth groups and organizations that were initially coordinated 
online. Members of groups like the 6 April youth movement and “We are all Khaled 
Said” learned, over ten years, how to effectively protest and what likely responses to 
expect from the different security forces.105Due to experience combined with 
networking, and protest education from Project on Middle East Democracy, United States 
Government sponsored International Republican, National Democratic Institutions, and 
Freedom House, activists from OTPOR, and from Tunisian demonstrators, allowed 
Egyptians to learn tactics and skills that would mitigate any coercive responses and 
potentially shift allegiance of the security elements they would confront.106 
1. Interior Ministry  
The behavior and responses of the Interior Ministry was a product of years of 
training and rehearsal. All members supported the regime as a result of experience, 
indoctrination, personal influence or gain. Hosni Mubarak and his regime did not expect 
the size of protest that would be created from the 2011 movement. The regime had 
complete control of Interior Ministry and its body of CSF conscripts used to its traditional 
role as a tool of suppression and intimidation.  
Protest organizers had been planning a type of event since the failure of the 
Kefaya! (Enough!) Movement in 2004 and the 6 April textile revolt in 2008.107 
Approximately two weeks prior to events, word of a protest was made available; 
coinciding with a national holiday celebrating police, 25 January 2011 was selected to 
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become a “Day of Anger.”108 Online, the April 6 Youth Movement signed up 90,000 
Egyptians to protest, “We are all Khaled Said” had 400,000 members. With 20 to just 
over 28 percent of Egyptians online—connection reliability unknown—word had to get 
out further.109 Enlisting public transportation drivers helped protest information spread 
farther and deeper into Egypt by word of mouth, cell phones. Distributing 50,000 leaflets 
and flyers ensured widest circulation.110 While precautions were taken to limit 
information that was available to security forces, the protest organizers knew their 
communications were being monitored.111 One organizer, Asmaa Mahfouz, unmasked 
herself a week before the protest. She believed she could get a greater response to a more 
personal entreaty to the people of Egypt, and she was right. In her uploaded video, she 
connected the situation in Tunisia to events in Egypt and appealed to the honor of 
Egyptian men to protect her from the traditional suppression of the state.112  
Across Cairo and further into Egypt, there was common knowledge of an 
impending event going to happen in Tahrir Square. The Interior Ministry was unaware of 
accurate protest start points; the organizers provided multiple false meet sites throughout 
the city to spread the CSF forces thinly, and identified actual locations only the day 
prior.113 There is limited documented information available that provides insight into the 
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actions of the SSIS, but there is no reason for the higher leadership to know this revolt 
would be different requiring a change tactics. The officers worked their respective 
sources and monitored Internet and cellular communications as best as they could, 
deploying across Cairo and other cities in preparation for the morning protest.  
The first day of the protest began with police out in force, blocking routes around 
the city and directing protestors, but not interfering with their movement, “showing 
unusual restraint.” Police observed the protests allowing people to march in a release of 
political pressure claiming they were under orders not to interfere.114 Due in large part to 
the history of the CSF, there was little positive interaction between the protestors and 
police. Protestors asked police “you are our brothers, why do you beat us and gas us?”115 
Others chanted “peacefully, peacefully,” “down with Mubarak” and “freedom,” 
demanding an end to the regime of government corruption and abuse “as police 
charged…beating them with sticks.”116 The day progressed and the crowds only grew, 
upwards of 30,000 people in Cairo and 20,000 in Alexandria. Police and CSF began to 
intervene.117 Interior Ministry riot police attacked with tear gas, water cannons and 
armored vehicles as “thousands of protestors stood their ground,” some responding by 
throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails.118 The predominantly nonviolent protestors were 
met with human walls of police that blocked and beat protesters as they marched through 
the city.119 The experience of the “ultras” die hard soccer fans played a particular role in 
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combating the tactics of CSF on the way to Tahrir.120 The decision to pick numerous start 
points throughout the cities served to reduce the concentration of police forces attacking 
protestors in any one area while clashes occurred across the country.  
As the protests continued over eighteen days, elements of the Interior Ministry, 
and by extension the regime, seemed caught off guard by the demonstrators and failed to 
take the protest seriously.121 The president neglected to address the people of his country 
until 28 January, listening to his advisors and relying on tactics of the past.122 The hubris 
of the regime flowed into the police ranks with an officer quoted saying, “whoever raises 
his head today, we [police] will stamp on it with our feet.”123 The use of traditional 
coercive measures seemed only to stir up greater support for the people in the square, the 
very definition of political jiu-jitsu.124 The CSF commanders continued to press 
protestors, often using lethal force.125 The battle on the Kasr al-Nil bridge footage 
exhibited riot police running over peaceful demonstrators with cars, shooting them with 
water cannons and tear gas as they stopped to pray.126 The activist dispersion tactic 
worked, drawing thousands out of their homes.127 A push of demonstrators later in the 
day forced the CSF to the east side of the bridge. By the evening of 29 January 2011, Al 
Jazeera English reported “108 dead…some by live ammunition.”128   
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A few events seem to stick out as desperate moves by a regime on the edge –by 
cutting off the Internet Mr. Mubarak sought to control the flow of information, going so 
far as to attack foreign journalists at one stage.129 Observing recent events in Tunisia and 
the impact of the Internet and mobile phones on that regime’s unrest, he shut most of 
Egypt’s Internet and cellular connections to the world early in the morning of 28 January 
2011.130 While the regime’s intention was to intimidate and control what the population 
heard, saw, and was able to transmit to the rest of the world as well as preempt protestor 
coordination later that day, the government unintentionally helped the anti-government 
movement. Protest organizers met the night before, coordinating movement specifics, 
protest starting points, and sharing tactics gathered from other activists; there was no real 
need of the Internet the morning of the “The Day of Rage.” One of the main objectives of 
the protest was to get people on the street, and the president helped. People were less able 
to see what was going on or check on friends and family from their homes. In an attempt 
to fill this information gap they flocked outside to see what was going on, where family 
members were, and if they were okay.131 The communication shutdown had a negative 
impact on the very forces it was designed to aid. After hours of fighting, supplies and 
manpower depleted or “got lost.” Security personnel were unable to use cell phones as 
backup communications, causing less effective security movements and coordination.132 
Another event was the seeming evaporation of visible Internal Ministry and police 
personnel in Cairo and much of the country on 28 January.133 The CSF had been fully 
deployed for four days throughout Egypt, specifically Cairo and Alexandria, conducting 
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aggressive operations. After hours of fighting with demonstrators, conscripts were tired 
and bereft of sleep, food, ammunition, and batteries; they melted away under the constant 
pressure.134 The security vacuum created by the lack of police turned to chaos when Mr. 
Mubarak authorized the release of approximately 8,000 inmates from jails in Alexandria, 
Suez, and Cairo. In an effort to reaffirm President Mubarak as “guarantor of security,” 
criminals and plainclothes security personnel looted and caused violence across Egypt in 
an attempt to panic the population.135 Events on 2 February added to this scene. Known 
as the Battle of the Camel, approximately 3000 pro-government supporters—off duty 
police, paid thugs (otherwise known as bultagiya), criminals, and poor- led to believe a 
quick end to the protests would bring a renewed tourist economy—charged into the 
square. Supported by snipers and thugs on rooftops and men on horses and camels, these 
supporters violently attacked the demonstrators in Tahrir Square as army personnel 
watched.136 Across the Nile from Tahrir, an estimated 20,000 “angry but…peaceful” pro-
government supporters held a rally in an attempt to sway popular perception, and support, 
behind Mr. Mubarak.137 Protestors were forced to defend themselves, forming vigilante 
patrols to protect neighborhoods and rescue demonstrators. “With every death of a 
demonstrator, popular sympathy mounted and more people rushed to support the 
protestors.”138 
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2. Ministry of Defense 
  The Egyptian Military has dutifully cultivated an image of “protector of 
the nation” for over sixty years.139 While the senior leadership and commanders at the 
time supported the regime, (Defense Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi was 
referred to as “Mubarak’s poodle,”) midlevel officers and lower enlisted were dissatisfied 
and responded positively to protestor supplications of support.140 Some U.S. Embassy 
cables from 2008 tell of aggrieved midlevel officers upset with stodgy senior leadership 
concerned with loyalty more than ability. There were real concerns as to whether the 
military would support the president and if the rank-and-file, if ordered, would suppress 
the protestors.141  
After four days of protest and hours of battle throughout the country, a tired and 
beaten force of riot police withdrew from the field; a worried President Mubarak ordered 
the army to enforce a curfew and suppress the protestors on the evening of 28 January. 
For the first time in almost twenty-five years the military was sent to restore order.142 By 
the time the military was in place protecting state buildings, protestors had already 
burned six Cairo police stations and the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters. 
As the military entered the scene the demonstrators had mixed opinions, many protestors 
welcomed them while others were scared, believing the military would fall in line behind 
the regime.143 Activist organizers understood from history and their training that “no 
revolution succeeds as long as the old regime’s military is willing and capable of 
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suppressing it” and took measures to impact army capability.144 Protestors wanted the 
military to act in their favor or at least remain neutral, but were prepared to hinder 
operations if required.145  
Organizers decided to use a method of engagement some dubbed “hug a 
soldier.”146 The demonstrators sought to win the rank and file over to their side so that if 
ordered to enforce the curfew or use violence, rank and file soldiers might hesitate, drag 
their feet, or disobey the order entirely. To this end, protestors showered the soldiers with 
affection, spoke with them, sang the national anthem, gave flowers, shouted slogans of 
inclusion like, “Stand for Your Country,” “Long Live Egypt,” “Let injustice and 
corruption fall,” or “the people and the Army are one hand!”147 The movement’s top 
priority was to remain peaceful and nonviolent all while presenting a unified, unbiased 
front.148 The intent was to ensure Egyptians felt safe to participate in the demonstration 
and reduce fear in soldiers so they would have no reason to shoot. Any attempt to shift 
the dynamic or perception of the movement was quickly altered by the masses.149 The 
soldiers on the ground interacted with the protestors first hand while senior leaders dealt 
with pressure from international benefactors, taking into account multiple outcomes and 
judging how best to maintain power.150  
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The military, as an institution, was not on the protestors’ side at first, but the 
activists worked hard to sway their opinion.151 “Hug a soldier” seems to have worked on 
some if not most soldiers; the first day military units were shown on Al-Jazeera being 
greeted by protestors.152 In his book Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to 
Revolt Hazem Kandil chronicles: 
 A group of demonstrators threw themselves over an army jeep 
before it reached Downtown Cairo, crying frantically: ‘Are you here to 
shoot us.’ A colonel descended from the vehicle and wrapped his arm 
around a demonstrator’s shoulders and replied: ‘You have nothing to fear. 
We would cut our hands before firing one bullet. Your demands are 
legitimate. Go ahead, and don’t turn back.’153 
Another shouted from a speaker, “I don’t care what happens, but you are the ones 
who are going to make a change.” Soldiers took photos with protestors and allowed 
graffiti on their vehicles denouncing the president. The curfew the military had been 
deployed to enforce was completely ignored.154 Some soldiers remained firm against the 
protest; Amy Austin Holmes relates an interview where a witness saw “a soldier 
kill…twelve people.” In other interviews, soldiers joined the uprising out of uniform, a 
treasonous offense.155 The final test of the tactic’s success came on the evening of 30 
January; President Mubarak ordered the “Egyptian Third Army to crush the 
demonstrators in Tahrir.” Tank commanders were reportedly seen removing their 
headsets, and calling their fathers—as it later turns out—for advice; they were told to 
disobey, and they did.156 The front line troops had sided with the protestors, “hug a 
soldier” served its purpose. 
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When senior military leaders declared on 31 January, “the armed forces will not 
resort to use force against our great people” as long as protestors remained peaceful, it 
was largely because they were unable to guarantee anything else.157 The military held to 
its word, but just because soldiers would not fire on the crowds did not mean they would 
protect the crowds either. On 2 February, military units around Tahrir Square passively 
watched as thousands of pro-Mubarak thugs and plainclothes police got off busses and 
entered the square. The demonstrators formed a human chain to separate the groups, but 
thugs broke through and attacked the largely peaceful protestors. After an hour of battle 
activists began to defend themselves, throwing concrete and rocks; they observed soldiers 
taking refuge behind tanks and armored personnel carriers. In another area, two tanks 
moved forward and a soldier fired into the air and gave the pro-Mubarak supports pause 
in their advance. Anti-government protestors begged the tank crews for protection and an 
officer asked “you want me to fire at Egyptians?”158 Completely confused by the lack of 
military assistance, activists asked what was going on and their response was simple, “we 
don’t have orders to [help]…go home.”159 The military wanted to gauge the activists’ 
desire and see if Mubarak’s thugs would cow them. Protestors in the square and around 
the country rose to the challenge and took responsibility for their own protection. They 
united and formed groups that fought, evacuated and treated causalities, brought food and 
water, ferried rocks to the fighters, and vigilante groups to protect their neighborhoods 
and help others in trouble.160  
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Throughout the week, soldiers on the sideline saw the valor of the activists and 
began to more visibly side with the protestors in the square. After the army separated the 
opposing sides, Major Ahmed Ali Shuman, and later Major Amr Metwally and Major 
Tamer Badr, along with thirteen other military officers dramatically turned in their 
weapons and joined the movement.161 The tenacity of the protestors over the eighteen 
days gradually had an effect on military leadership and elite. After vicious attacks and 
heavy repression, protestors retained a largely nonviolent stance able to characterize 
violence that did occur as self-defense as hundreds of thousands of people remained in 
Tahrir Square and more arrived daily. General officers turned politicians, Vice President 
Omar Suleiman and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, sought guidance from outside the 
regime to help explain and resolve the confusion in the streets.162 Ultimately, military 
support to President Mubarak collapsed in the face of activists, and the regime fell with 
it.163  
D. ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
 The events in Egypt’s 2011 Uprising fit into Anika Binnendijk’s strategic 
framework explained earlier, specifically by aiding the shifting the allegiance of the 
military. The protestors focused efforts on creating and maintaining a positive 
relationship with the military, building on a nationalist ideation held by Egyptians about 
the Ministry of Defense. Demonstrators knew their efforts would not be as effective on 
Interior Ministry forces and wore them out, driving them off the streets and forcing the 
regime to rely on military intervention. The regime had delegitimized itself with years of 
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corruption, greed, and repression made manifest in the death of Khalid Said. The 
movement mobilized an estimated 15 million people, elevating coercive costs 
dramatically.164 Accommodation costs were negligible when the military could negotiate 
a way to maintain power in any regime that came after. Likely success was initially found 
in Tunisia and the successful struggle in that comparative country, and grew with every 
person that arrived in Tahrir and every day the square was occupied .   
1. Expose Regime Illegitimacy165 
 The Mubarak regime went a long way toward delegitimizing itself; the 
activists just had to make the average Egyptian realize and act. In the decades prior to the 
2011 Uprising, Egyptians had faced years of economic and political corruption. The state 
was under the control of the Interior Ministry and the ministry was with the president. 
The military had allowed its own economic machine which required senior leader time 
and conscript manpower, to account for estimates of ten to fifteen percent of the Egyptian 
economy.166  
   The economic effects of Mr. Mubarak’s policies became a constant 
reminder of his felonious presidency. Efforts to liberalize the Egyptian economy 
generated great profits for the elite, but further reduced the already limited resources 
available to the poor, 47 percent of which lived on less than U.S.$2 a day. Agricultural 
reforms effectively removed seven million families from land they had lived off for 
generations, stealing their livelihoods. Subsidies were reduced by 20 percent. Diminished 
access to clean drinking water made life that much more difficult.167 The growing youth 
population could not find work, 40 percent of men and 50 percent of women were 
unemployed, all this with an economy growing six percent per year since 2007.168 The 
elite got richer through statewide corruption. The president and his cronies sold, and 
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sometimes gave, his country away for pennies; Minister of Agriculture gave 11,556 
feddans of land to an elite who later sold 8,000 of those feddans for EG£350 million.169 
In another instance, property worth EG£8,000 was sold for EG£300.170 The burden of 
this institutionalized corruption was passed on to the backs of the poor and bribery often 
used to make up the difference.171  
Voting laws prevented real political competition, Law 114 of 1983 changed 
Egypt’s political system to a proportional representation system. Legally, a party wanting 
to get into government had to obtain eight percent of the national vote or all their votes 
went to the party with the largest percentage or the NDP. The law effectively blocked any 
opposition party seeking office and simultaneously alienated independent candidates 
from running.172 The Interior Ministry ensured the political system was stacked against 
change, it supervised all voting and vote counting for presidential, legislative, and local 
elections to ensure political victory, a visual reminder of the regime’s influence.173 
Parliamentary elections of 2010 were particularly fraudulent; the regime obviously 
“rigged” the election. Witnesses captured numerous images of blatant intimidation and 
vote fixing throughout Egypt; they were put online for all to see. Any pretense of 
including the opposition was ignored as the election concluded with almost no opposition 
in Parliament.174 Egypt had one way of political expression, the protest.  
The regime’s disdain for the people of Egypt was a visible fact of everyday life 
that just needed a voice. Egyptians’ ability to contest the status quo was severely 
restricted; any party that was able to contest the NDP suffered harassment and banning. 
The other parties were fractious and unable to gain a base of support or were co-opted by 
the government. The NDP increasingly monopolized political space preventing any 
expression of contestation. Activists sought other methods of expression that 
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incorporated their ideas for change. Protests and demonstrations emerged as the singular 
political space increasingly made available to Egyptians, and opportunities for activists to 
train grew from numerous protests and movements throughout the last decade that 
emerged “from structural failure, growing political discontent…and a strong desire for 
reform.”175 Kifaya! can be traced as the progenitor of the 2011 Uprising, the first time 
people spoke out against the regime and seen as the first opening of political space.176 As 
one of the more popular movements with a wide base of support that sought to end a 
“Mubarak dynasty” before it began, Kifaya exposed activist leaders of 2011 to the 
potential of popular protest.177 The student supported textile workers’ strike in 2008 
provided the training backdrop for the 6 April Movement, Khalid Said and Tunisia did 
the rest. 178 
Khalid Said was a middle-class businessman who captured video of police 
officers dividing the spoils from a drug bust. In an effort to obtain the footage and punish 
him for filming, police found him in a cyber café. Dragging him out into the street, police 
beat him to death; witnesses quote police saying, “‘you are dead anyway.’”179 The police 
say that he carried drugs. Attempts were made by officials to ignore the crime, but the 
gruesome murder was captured and posted online. Outraged family and friends did not 
believe the police version of events; they pointed out that it is the police job to arrest, not 
punish.180 Khalid’s face became a rallying cry for the youth of Egypt, many 
understanding that he was “everyman.” “All of us are Khalid Said. Because we can face 
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or might face, or might face the same destiny at any point in time.”181 Khalid was killed 
in 2010 and his death moved the population. For young activists, raised in the shadow of 
Kifaya! and 6 April, Khalid’s death elevated awareness of repression in Egypt through 
the Internet. Wael Ghonim began a Facebook page, created in Khalid’s honor to keep the 
memory of his sacrifice alive and gathered hundreds of thousands of friends.182 YouTube 
and Twitter were also used to spread word of the plight of Egyptians; #khaledsaid has 
over 430,000 followers.183 Social ties from the Internet merged with stronger 
interpersonal social connections that spread news of Khalid across the country through 
word of mouth, and cell phones.184 The fuse was lit. 
Tunisia was the second spark that started a blaze of mobilization in Egypt. The 
success of the Tunisian Revolution (Jasmine Revolution) demonstrated to the people of 
Egypt that change can happen in an authoritarian regime. President Zin El Abidine Ben 
Ali was forced from office on 14 January 2011 after almost four months of protest and 
violence. Tunisia’s spark was the death of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bououzid. His 
self-immolation was a testament to the frustration that the people felt under an 
authoritarian ruler who held control through the application repression and incentives, 
much like that of Egypt’s President Mubarak.185 President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia 
with his family after 23 years in office.186 The Tunisian Revolution left a distinct 
impression on organizers in Egypt who learned and got advice from counterparts in 
Tunisia. Activists shared movement goals and slogans and the concept of linking groups 
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of people to the desire for regime change and economic benefit. This influence tied youth 
and labor which became a decisive factor in the movement.187    
2. Establish Challenger Legitimacy 
The primary legitimizing factor for the Opposition was public participation in the 
protests of 25 January that fed off the violence visited upon it by security forces. In order 
for Egypt to experience the same effects as Tunisia, activist leaders realized that they had 
to mobilize people. The Activist leaders researched successful uprisings and received 
training from around the world learning that regime change can happen through peaceful 
methods.188 They learned the importance of building alliances and shaping public 
perception. Kifaya! and 6 April showed them that mobilization could be carried out and 
Tunisia showed them it could be successful. 
Protest leaders shaped their argument in ways for it apply to the most people, 
linking politics with economic problems. They outlined four main demands: 
(1) Address the problem of poverty by increasing minimum wages, 
improving education and health services, and providing unemployment 
benefits to the youth; (2) end the state of emergency, put an end to torture, 
and respect court sentences; (3) dismiss the Minister of Interior; and (4) 
limit the president to only two terms.189  
These demands resonated with the population. With 47 percent of the population living 
on less than U.S.$2 dollars and the complete disregard shown the people during the 2010 
Parliamentary elections, Egyptians had a clear understanding of their position in the 
regime. Khalid Said’s death proved a vivid reminder of the potential fate of all Egyptians 
who stood against corruption. The messages were out in the country, spoken about in 
taxis and on busses.190 People had to know they were not alone in their fight for change.  
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Egyptian Law Number 162 of 1958, otherwise known as the Emergency Law in 
2011, had been in force since 1981, President Mubarak’s entire presidency.191 Intended 
to help maintain stability during short periods of time, this law effectively stifled political 
freedom and speech. The law made it illegal for more than a “handful of people to 
gather” without permission, and gave security forces the ability to arrest almost anyone, 
potentially detaining them for years with or without trial, carte blanche.192 Activist 
leaders devised ways of working within the constraints of this suffocating political 
system. Called “silent stands,” these events became ways for unknown members that 
supported a cause, linked only by an idea and a web page, to show solidarity with one 
another. Operating like a flash mob, protestors received information on when and where 
to gather via the Internet or by cell phone. Participants wore a certain color, performed a 
certain task, or both; they did not gather in groups and were separated by a distance from 
one another. The Emergency Law was not violated, but protestors could look around and 
see others wearing a black or white shirt standing on the shore of the Nile or alone on a 
bridge and know that they were one of many who wanted change. Silent stands were held 
throughout Egypt protesting the death of Khalid Said, images posted online reinforced 
the perception of an illegitimate state seeking to punish its people for doing the right 
thing.193     
Protest leaders strictly framed their protest in nonviolent terms throughout the 
2011 Uprising. They sought to maintain a positive image fearing violence would play 
into the regime’s hands.194 They continually incorporated slogans of inclusion, used 
national songs and flags, and stressed the peaceful nature of the movement.195 The 
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disciplined protestors ensured others stayed on message and policed themselves, ensuring 
that security forces had no reason to attack them.196 The effects of this tactic combined 
with the timing of protests, worked for the people of Egypt. Hundreds of thousands of 
people of different ages, status, and religion went into the streets in support and 
solidarity.197 The regime saw the effects of the mollifying tactic and made efforts to 
disrupt it. Events on 2 February demonstrate the lengths the regime went to break this 
peaceful demeanor; by that time it was too late, the perception of the demonstrators as 
peaceful had already been cemented in the minds of Egyptians as images of police 
brutality inundated the population.198 Total participation over the eighteen days was 
estimated between twelve and fifteen million people.199 The number of people involved 
in the protest correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the group. Rank-and-file 
members of the military were the first regime elements to show a break in loyalty. By the 
end of the day on 31 January, senior military officials confirmed the institution would not 
interfere with protests and the crowds grew further, secure in their faith in the military.200 
Well-known people from political, entertainment and religious communities added the 
weight of their influence to the swelling numbers of people in the streets. The public 
relations spokesman of Al-Azhar University, Mohammed Rafah Tahtawy commented, 
“My position is a position of support to the revolution…till the last drop of my blood.”201 
The people of Egypt kept coming to Tahrir Square, and other public squares around the 
country, with no end in sight.  
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3. Raise Repressive Costs  
In the past, repression was more acceptable to authoritarian regimes largely due to 
a state’s ability to control media and repress information, preventing any images or 
reporting from getting out of the country. The rapid expansion of technological capacity 
in Egypt and the Middle East has reduced the authoritarian state’s ability to effectively 
repress the flow of information. As more information is able to leave the country, 
external actors have a greater potential role in a state’s internal decisions by employing 
sanctions or other punishments. An activist’s ability to push information outside the 
country may not have any effect on the country’s policies, but it provides a clear increase 
to repressive costs. 
While Egypt had a significant and growing Internet presence in 2011, television 
and newsprint were still major sources of information for Egyptians. “Almost 90 percent 
of Egyptian households have televisions” while newspaper circulation is approximately 
“55 papers per 1000 people” across the country.202 Since the 1990s, Egypt has gradually 
increased space for political discourse on television and in newspapers. Arab satellite 
stations based throughout the region appeared and created an opening for more privately 
owned firms.203 While the private firms were able to get licenses to produce profit-
making newspapers, they were still subject to prosecution under secretive laws that had 
arbitrary enforcement records for any violation. These newspapers were the first to report 
actual events in the country, contrary to state run media.204 Television (TV) operated in a 
similar way; state-run TV reported the state line of “facts,” private stations were subject 
to arbitrary rules and regulations. As the state progressively lost control,  room was 
created for a freer press. The international press is free of sanctions outside of the state, 
but government ministries could withhold access to bandwidth or power and sanction 
Egyptians speaking against the regime.205 
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The regime’s attempt to regain control of information by harassment, arrest, and 
shutting down access not only backfired in the streets, but alienated external actors, state 
supporters, and the media personalities and companies themselves. Attacks on foreign 
media degraded any pro-Mubarak bias TV personalities may have had.206 Many found 
ways around the near total communication shut down, and information still got out. Al 
Jazeera continued to show the world what was happening in Egypt buy broadcasting 
through other carriers, even after their people were arrested.207 Obtaining the moniker 
“Voice of the Revolution,” Al Jazeera played a large role in reporting events taking place 
in Egypt, both within and outside the country, often being the only source available. The 
United States was a particular consumer of this resource.208 Videos and podcasts 
uploaded to the web showed the regime’s repressive tactics being used on largely 
peaceful protestors.209 As the eighteen days continued, the United States was forced to 
move further and further away from President Mubarak, a key regional ally. However, 
when the protestors were being more violent in response to the repressive tactics of the 
regime, a perception of self-defense was attributed to anti-government demonstrators, and 
the response was accepted as necessary.  
Egypt had made itself a regional leader in Internet usage and technology with 20 
to just over 28 percent of Egyptians online in 2011, and 86.5 percent of Egyptians with 
cell phones.210 The combination of cell phones with the Internet gave a portion of that 
86.5 percent the ability to take pictures and video, uploading those images to various 
websites across the Internet. While the state offered money to thugs and Interior Ministry 
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personnel had increased privileges in Egyptian society, technology offered the opposition 
the ability to sanction security and pro-Mubarak protestors, and they did. Images of CSF 
and pro-Mubarak thugs were taken throughout the eighteen days and posted on a Flickr 
based “group pool” called Piggipedia. Anti-government protestors were able to take 
pictures and other images were found in raided offices during the uprising. The pictures 
were uploaded for all to see and could be used as a resource for others to identify and 
ostracize people who “kept files on the people of Egypt on behalf of the regime.”211 
Media reports coming out of Egypt forced the United States into a conundrum, 
continue to support Mr. Mubarak’s regime and violate democratic ideals professed since 
World War II, or support protestors that hold little love for the United States, and risk 
regional instability while alienating other authoritarian regimes. The United States has a 
long history with Egypt; most administrations saw the Egyptian government as a 
moderating regional force. The close relationship of the two countries has helped 
guarantee Arab-Israeli Peace since 1979, and has provided almost U.S.$100 billion in 
economic and military aid to Egypt.212 On television, feed from Al Jazeera broadcasts, 
rebroadcast by other agencies, provided images of unarmed protestors being beaten by 
armored riot police.213 Video of religious protestors bowing to pray being hit with tear 
gas siphoned away regime support.214 In light of the media coverage, on 28 January, the 
U.S. said it would reassess assistance, but U.S. support to the regime did not change.215 
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On 30 January, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “We want to see an orderly 
transition…that will bring about a democratic participatory government.”216  
President Mubarak’s attempts at acting as if in a democracy allowed space for 
elements of democratic practice to be expressed. The opening of media in the 1990s had 
allowed a greater variety of news available to the public, not all state controlled. The 
nonstandard practice of rule enforcement allowed some the ability to get away with 
speaking out. Technological advancement further increased space for public discourse, 
but now private individuals could blog. While the state did its best to control information, 
it sometimes failed. The SSIS agents and police involved in beatings could be caught on 
tape and pictures published on the web. Piggipedia became a way to ostracize 
government thugs and agents within their own neighborhoods. Groups were able to 
communicate online and further disseminate tactics through more traditional means. 
Once the uprising began, the protestors just had to stay in the streets, countering the 
repression of the CSF, a government response that presented international media a visible 
target. Other Egyptians witnessed their government’s repression and added their numbers 
to the uprising. The potential cost of repressive tactics became too great due to the 
crowds and media coverage. The final straw was the addition to the uprising of more 
conservative professional groups and labor. Labor decided to add its significant numbers 
and economic impact to the protest on 8 February which broke the back of the regime. 
After days of protesting, violent repression, offers of concession from the regime, and 
refusals of the people, labor unions joined the fight.217 Workers had suffered the brunt of 
negative effects created by the economic reform policies enacted. While a common 
practice, work strikes and stoppages had become exceedingly popular in 2007.218 The 6 
April protest of 2008 in Mahalla at the state owned Misr Helwan Spinning and Weaving 
Company protested high prices, low wages, delays in payments, and privatization; 
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security force repression, a typical response, led to the death of a 15-year-old bystander, 
Ahmad Ali Mabrouk.219 In 2011, President Mubarak ordered Egyptians back to work on 
8 February, adjusting curfews to facilitate their movement. The economic demands made 
full circle as thousands of Egyptians refused to work and demanded Mubarak’s ouster.220 
“Six thousand workers walked out in the Suez Canal Zone and twenty-five hundred 
textile and steel workers went on strike in Suez…Twenty-four thousand textile workers 
in Mahal[l]a…In Assyut, eight thousand protestors blocked the main highway and 
railroad to Cairo.”221 Professional associations joined and the threat to Egypt’s economy 
became very real.222 
4. Reduce Accommodation Costs 
Throughout the protests, while U.S. military and political officials spoke to their 
counterparts urging the military to not fire on civilians, there was no discussion of cutting 
of aid in the administration.223 The media coverage created the perception that the U.S. 
administration supported the Egyptian dictator, counter to the obvious desires of Egypt’s 
people, or it was hedging its bets between the two camps. By 1 February, President 
Barack Obama is reported saying “It is time to present the people of Egypt its next 
government,” to President Mubarak in their last conversation.224 By all reports, Mr. 
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Mubarak just ignored the stern language , although the fact that a longtime supporter of 
the regime had made the statement was sure to cause concern; military leaders would see 
things differently. 
President Obama’s public comments and other administration-authorized 
communications gave tacit approval from the U.S., which gives U.S.$1.3 billion in 
Egyptian military aid, to the Egyptian military to plan for the stability of Egypt, with or 
without Mr. Mubarak.225 While there is no evidence that U.S. opinion was a significant 
contributing factor in the decision to remove Mr. Mubarak from office, it was a 
consideration.226 From the moment the Egyptian Army was called in to secure the 
population there was the question if the men in the streets and on the tanks would obey 
the orders of senior leadership.227 Of primary concern was the military’s place in the 
current regime and its possible place in any future regime.  
The military continued to be pushed out of positions of influence within the 
regime. All Egyptian presidents had gradually pushed military influence out of the 
cabinet; officers in the cabinet fell from a high of 66 percent with President Nasser down 
to a low 9.1 percent in 1977 which was maintained through the 2011 Uprising.228 
Additionally, President Mubarak and the NDP had been working since 2004 to push his 
youngest son, Gamal Mubarak into the head executive position.229 As the uprising 
continued, it presented an opportunity for the military to regain power and shape its 
                                                 
225 Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2009): 35. (different year) U.S. military aid was U.S.$1.3 billion in FY2009 and 
FY2010. An MOU with Israel increases their military assistance from U.S.$2.4 billion to U.S.$3 billion by 
FY2018. 
226 Military Decision Making Process is designed to ensure all factors are reviewed, no matter how 
insignificant a factor, opinion, or placements of forces may appear to be. 
227 Fisk, “As Mubarak Clings;” Hicham Bou Nassif, “Why the Egyptian Army Didn’t Shoot,” Middle 
East Research and Information Project, accessed 31 October 2013, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer265/why-
egyptian-army-didnt-shoot. 
228 Kandil, Soldiers, 70, 107. 
229 Kandil, Soldiers, 152, 153; Springborg and Henry, “Army Guys,” 18. In 2004, six of Gamal 
Mubarak’s compatriots were placed in charge of ministries that “directly related to their businesses… [and] 
a number of prominent neo-liberal intellectuals.” Gamal’s supporters took the cabinet and spread 
throughout the NDP and government all working toward a presidency for Gamal Mubarak. The Kefaya! 
Movement in 2004 started as a result. 
 50
influence within the system.230 Military leadership appears to have worked behind the 
scenes—getting President Mubarak to appoint Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq and Vice 
President Omar Suleiman both with military ties—so it could regain some power and 
influence within the Mubarak government.231 When the senior leaders realized the 
protestors were not going anywhere and an ordered crackdown was disobeyed, the 
military proceeded on a course that provided it with the best outcome while maintaining 
popular support of the protestors.232 
The large crowds of demonstrators created strength and safety. The initial protests 
on 25 January surprised protest organizers who scheduled a larger protest on 28 January 
scheduling it for just after midday prayers on a Friday at a time when most Muslims go to 
prayer. Start points were determined the night before and distributed face-to-face. The 
communications shutdown that occurred in the early hours of the 28 January forced 
curious people onto the streets. The protest started in the poorer sections of town. In 
Cairo, they started in the Imbaba neighborhood around the mosques, gathering people as 
they marched; activists left the area with 30,000 to 100,000 people, all headed to Tahrir 
Square.233 Once they occupied Tahrir they consolidated, creating popular committees 
with specific tasks. Some occupied buildings creating makeshift clinics for wounds 
acquired in the march, others were formed to protect against criminals and thugs, and still 
others collected and distributed food and water.234 The protestors maintained a 
predominantly nonviolent posture and welcomed soldiers with open arms, songs and 
slogans of unity, hugs, and flowers.235 Observers identified with the protest, were able to 
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see on TV or the Internet, when they came back on, that the military was not using force. 
More and more people came out believing in their safety assured by their knowledge the 
military would not fire.236 
5. Highlight Success Potential 
Egyptians would not have been as willing to join the protest if events in Tunisia 
had ended differently. People in Egypt identified with the repression and fear of those 
living under the Tunisian regime. Through TV and the Internet, the people of Egypt 
watched President Ben Ali try to ban the Internet and had his police shoot his people. 
Protestors posted tactics, like rubbing tear gas strained eyes with Coke instead of water, 
on the Internet for others to use.237 They saw a largely leaderless group of people come 
together under duress and saw a former president flee a country. They watched as a group 
of regular people made a profound change.238   
Protest organizers knew that the internal security forces were going to be less 
inclined to support them because of their historic interactions with the CSF and SSI. 
Leaders understood that there efforts of inclusion would have greater efficiency if used 
on the military which had the tense relationship with the Interior Ministry that culminated 
in the violent repression of the CSF in 1986.239  If they played up the “protector of the 
realm” perception the military had fostered and identified with for 60 years, used slogans 
and actions of inclusion, they would make any order to attack the protestors difficult to 
obey.240 With an estimated 15 million in the crowd—there was a high probability that 
some of their families were in the mix.241  
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As the people conquered and reconquered Tahrir Square, the police seemed to 
vanish.242 The security vacuum coincided with a prisoner “escape” intended to create fear 
and keep people indoors. This, too, backfired as Egyptians used their created committees 
to further protect the city, bringing people out to help each other.243 The “hug a soldier” 
welcome the Egyptian Army received from the protestors gave the impression of unity 
built upon a perceived trust of the military. The increasing size of the crowds 
demonstrated popular consent of the people in support of the movement and gave soldiers 
comfort that they were doing right for their country and families by not harming the 
protestors. The military announcing it would not use force reinforced this belief and 
caused more people to go into the streets.244 Hundreds of thousands of people of all ages, 
status, and religions, came to squares throughout the county. Estimates of total 
participation over the eighteen day period are around 15 million.245 Subsequent strikes 
that occurred in the 2011 Uprising: worker parties, lawyers, doctors, judges, Suez Canal 
workers, many people of different social strata joining in, cemented success in the minds 
of the people.246 
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IV. REGIME CHANGE OF 2013 
The second case in this thesis applies the strategic framework to opposition and 
security force interactions in Egypt two years and four months after President Hosni 
Mubarak was removed from office. After 500 days of military rule under the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as Egypt’s first 
democratically elected president. The hope of the “country’s first free and fair” election 
faded over time.247 General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi and the SCAF, prompted by the support 
of a large segment of the population, removed Mr. Morsi from elected office after a series 
of policy decisions alienated a majority of Egyptians.248 Pro-Morsi supporters, the 
current opposition, took to the street using tactics similar to those effectively used in 
2011, but failed to influence any shift in allegiance. This thesis will focus on four 
incidents over a 41-day period in 2013 to illustrate an opposition’s inability to achieve 
any of Anika Binnendijk’s strategic objectives and the resulting security responses.249  
A. ELECTIONS, RIOTS AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
A member of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi defeated his opponent Ahmed 
Shafiq by a 3.7 percent margin or approximately 900,000 votes.250 President Morsi and 
his party were installed to rein in corruption, increase food security, bring economic 
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parity, and reduce widespread unemployment.251 In spite of his Islamist favoritism and 
background in the Muslim Brotherhood, an overall majority of Egyptians gave Mr. Morsi 
and his party an opportunity to improve their current situation; after decades of military 
rule, Egyptians were excited and hopeful for the future of their country.252  
Anti-Morsi and anti-Muslim Brotherhood protests began in August after the 
President issued a series of policy decisions restricting personal freedoms, press freedom, 
and placed Islamists in key government positions. His actions provided the impression 
that an Islamist takeover of Egypt was in the offing.253 Protests reminiscent of those in 
2011 began in earnest on 22 November; President Morsi gave himself pharaoh-like 
authority by issuing “a constitutional declaration which puts him beyond the bounds of 
judicial supervision;” the decree also prevented dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 
and Shura Council.254 The democratic hope of the 2011 Uprising and subsequent 
elections were swept aside by policies imposed by a leader who saw fit to arbitrarily 
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expand presidential power to eliminate “weevils eating away at the nation of Egypt” 
while alienating non-Islamists and youth.255  
Presidential support fell from a high of 57 percent in 2011 to 28 percent for the 
“disaffected plurality” a year later. Egypt witnessed little improvement during Mr. 
Morsi’s year in office. The economy grew only 2.3 percent in the first nine months of 
fiscal year 2013, the deficit grew 48 percent, public debt reached U.S.$188 billion by 
January 2013, and unemployment rose to 13.2 percent in the first quarter.256 While the 
president still represented hope to 96 percent of Egyptians with Islamic affiliations, a 
clear divide in the population based on ideology and religion caused massive protests 
throughout the country.257 Millions took to the streets in 2013, protesting a Muslim 
Brother who sought to rule as a “pharaoh,” create an Islamist theocracy, and do whatever 
it took to make those ideas real.258 Unverifiable sources estimate crowds swelled to 
“between 14 to 33 million people,” one third of the nation, that participated in 
countrywide protests calling for Mohamed Morsi to step down from the presidency. 
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While that figure is high and difficult to verify, crowds were large and reminiscent of 
Egypt’s 2011 “Arab Spring.”259 
After a 48-hour ultimatum to comply with public demands, military forces, 
directed by the SCAF, forced President Morsi out of office and presented a “road map” 
that was to lead to an expedited democracy.260 Thousands of pro-Morsi supporters set up 
camps and demonstrated against the military takeover. The first reported “mass killing” 
of Egyptian protestors occurred outside of the Republican Guard Headquarters on July 
2013 in Cairo; the Ministry of Health reported 51 civilians dead, 435 wounded.261 
Security forces would lethally engage pro-Morsi protestors, killing more than 30 civilians 
at three additional times over the next 40 days. Although it killed over 700 civilians the 
military retains its positive image of national protector.262 Intervening on the side of anti-
Morsi protestors has only slightly detracted from the positive perception of the military 
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among the majority of adult Egyptians. A Zogby poll conducted in the latter half of July 
2013 noted 93 percent of Egyptians “still retain confidence in the military as an 
institution.”263 The fact that they used live ammunition on protestors in one of the four 
incidents, just before the poll, seems to have deflated that number only by a single point 
from previous polls conducted the month prior.264  
B. SECURITY FORCE RESPONSES 
The security force response to opposition tactics and its corresponding loyalty 
decisions greatly contrast with security force decisions of 2011. The opposition of 2011 
was composed of a healthy mix of secularists, liberals, socialists, and Islamist youth that 
integrated a wide cross-section of the population; that cross-section of the population 
narrowed significantly in 2013. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists 
dominate the current opposition that supports the deposed president and seem to have 
adopted an attitude that has affected their ability to gain supporters.265 Additionally, 
tactics so effectively used in 2011 were ineffectively applied or ignored in the events of 
2013.  
The discussion in this section is broken into three parts describing the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and specific incidents. The ministry subsections will 
summarize any changes that occurred between the fall of President Mubarak and the 
mass killings. The incident discussion will describe each event, focusing on security 
actions and opposition tactics. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces 
worked in concert during these operations, but any divergence will be highlighted .  
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1. Interior Ministry 
Security reforms that many expected after the uprising of 2011 never truly 
materialized; the Interior Ministry instituted various cosmetic changes, but its basic 
construct and operation remained unchanged. In March of 2011, Interior Minister 
Mansour al –Issawi disbanded the dreaded SSIS and in the same statement announced the 
formation of the new National Security Agency (NSA) which has a similar set of 
specified tasks.266 Interior Minister Habib el-Adly and other senior leaders within the 
former SSIS were relieved of their responsibilities and several former officers were 
acquitted of all charges and returned to the new agency with a clean record.267 The 
Ministry of Interior offered little else to highlight any change in procedure or operations: 
pay for the majority of personnel remained low, very few benefits eased any economic 
disparity, and a negative perception of police continued.268 Numerous senior members of 
the former SSIS remain in positions of power and attempts at real reform within the 
organization are weak at best.269 The CSF still functions and operates as it did in the past, 
a hammer the regime uses to dissuade and control protests and riots.270 Amnesty 
international noted that after the 25 January Revolution “no reform of the police was 
initiated and the authorities employed tactics reminiscent of the Mubarak era;” pointing 
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out that the majority of all police arrested for crimes during the 2011 Uprising were 
acquitted. 271 Former president Morsi favored a gradual reform of security elements 
because he feared they would go AWOL when he needed most. To date, security force 
practices throughout the post-Mubarak period remained largely unchanged. 
2. Ministry of Defense  
In the aftermath of the 2011 Uprisings, the Egyptian Military held the esteem of 
the nation for its part in removing Hosni Mubarak and his cronies—popularly termed 
feloul—from power; the Egyptian military held an 88 percent approval rating in April of 
that year.272 The ruling council, having worked for the Egyptian people to remove a 
repressive president, found itself in an ideal position. The  council capitalized on this by 
taking control and moving toward elections thereby solidifying a positive perception with 
the public.273 In the months that followed, many pundits argued that the military worked 
harder to regain the prestige, power, and influence it had lost in the Mubarak years while 
seeking to protect its personnel from prosecution rather than trying to improve the 
country and its people.274 The Ministry of Interior was marginalized and co-opted into 
accepting negative press for government actions; the Ministry of Defense maintained a 
consistent, positive approval rating and held power throughout.275 The SCAF preserved 
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the oppressive tactics of the former regime by keeping Law Number 162 of 1958, the 
Emergency Law in effect, bringing approximately 12,000 civilians to military courts, 
conducting virginity tests, and limiting civilian assemblies.276 Anti-SCAF protests 
pressured the government throughout early 2012 resulting in a faster transition toward a 
civilian government.277 The first democratic election in Egypt’s long and storied history 
took place in June of 2012 and culminated with Mohamed Morsi being sworn into 
office.278  
C. INCIDENTS 
1. 8 July 2013  
When the SCAF issued its ultimatum on 1 July, and enforced it three days later, 
there was little doubt that the military, security services, and judiciary were not in full 
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agreement.279 The Interior Ministry notified the public on 10 June that the CSF and 
police would stay away from anti-Morsi protest locations and police officers, in and out 
of uniform, were clearly seen participating in the demonstrations at the end of the 
month.280 In the predawn hours of 8 July soldiers and police officers engaged pro-Morsi 
supporters in front of the Republican Guard Headquarters in Cairo. There are widely 
conflicting stories of what occurred and how things started. Muslim Brotherhood 
spokesmen claim that “peaceful protestors were performing the Fajjr (dawn) prayers 
when the army fired teargas and gunshots at them without any consideration for the 
sanctity of prayers or life.”281 Dr. Hassan Ahmed of the Qast al-Aini Hospital claimed 
that a young child and woman were among the dead. Abdel-Rahman el-Sakka, chief of 
the Health Insurance Authority saw no evidence of women or children that suffered 
injury.282 The military provided an alternative description of events claiming, “an ‘armed 
terrorist group’ attempted to break into the Republican Guard headquarters in the early 
hours of Monday and ‘attacked security forces.’”283 An unnamed doctor who witnessed 
the event stated that gunfire that started after his prayers drew him to a window where he 
observed men on motorcycles “coming from behind the protestors” toward the 
Republican Guard building and the military forces located there. The masked men 
appeared to be shooting and the army responded, shooting back.284 Whatever the stories 
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and their bias, Egyptians died; the Ministry of Health reported 51 civilians’ dead, 435 
wounded while the military claimed one officer dead, 42 soldiers wounded.285     
2. 27 July 2013  
A skirmish ensued between security forces and Morsi supporters, who were based 
around the Rabaa mosque in the al-Adaweya Square. As pro-Morsi protestors 
“approached the off ramp of…6th of October Bridge,” they were met by a group of CSF 
accompanied by armored vehicles and a large group of civilians that believe the 
protestors were expanding their camp into a major thoroughfare.286 The animosity 
between pro- and anti-Morsi camps had brought much violence to the streets in recent 
days.287 The police claim they intervened between the predominantly Islamist protestors 
and a group of residents displeased with the “encampment on their doorstep.”288 
Witnesses said protestors were seeking to expand the encampment in an attempt to deal 
with overcrowding, others thought they were preparing for another march.289 Protestors 
say they were unarmed when they met with police, but began using evocative language 
directed at the police before getting to the bridge. When the police responded with tear 
gas, protestors threw rocks, built barriers in the street, and shot back.290 The Brotherhood 
claims that the civilians and police fired live rounds to disperse the crowd; a spokesman 
for the organization accused the Minister of Interior of issuing the order.291 Dr. Ahmed 
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Abdullah said, “They [police] aimed at killing people.”292 A Dr. Fouad highlighted a 
pattern of wounds that indicated specifically targeted shots from an elevated position, that 
he saw a greater number of these when compared to the incident on 8 July.293 The 
Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim adamantly denied that any police officer had fired on 
the protestors saying, “his officers ‘have never and will never shoot a bullet on any 
Egyptian;’” He placed blame squarely on the shoulders of the Muslim Brotherhood, “we 
had to stop them.”294 The incident lasted several hours beginning around 2230 Friday 
evening and lasting through mid-morning on Saturday, bodies stopped arriving at the 
Rabaa al-Adawiya field hospital between 0700 and 0800.295 The Ministry of Health 
confirmed 74 dead and 748 wounded, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed 120 dead and 
over 4,000 wounded; Interior Minister Ibrahim reported police losses as two shot in the 
head and 14 wounded.296 
3. 14 August 2013  
The largest and most significant security force operation against pro-Morsi 
protestors, resulting in the majority of dead and wounded, occurred when military and 
police forces moved into the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares in the early 
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morning to disperse the sit-ins and remove the camps.297 The military backed 
government had been warning Morsi supporters of probable government action designed 
to clear the sit-in sites for more than two weeks when the incident took place; the 
government considered the supporters a threat to national security.298 In near 
simultaneous operations, police and military forces moved to cordon off the sit-in sites at 
dawn.299 While the army maintained security on the perimeter, the police began the al-
Nahda Square operation with a bulldozer maneuvering to clear wooden barriers and 
sandbags protestors erected to protect the camp; the first sound of tear gas was heard 
about an hour later. Witnesses report that the police “informed demonstrators that they 
were clearing the sit-in and ordered them to leave peacefully.” They allowed safe passage 
for women and children.300 The majority of protestors fled into the Orman Botanical 
Gardens or into the Giza Zoo across the street or disappeared into Cairo University while 
at least four were caught by residents and turned over to police.301 The smaller camp was 
quickly dispersed by midday, left a burnt mess that was secured and sealed off from the 
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public.302 Later in the afternoon, demonstrators attempted to retake al-Nahda Square but 
were held up in the Giza Zoo. Bursts of “machine guns, AK-47s, and shotgun fire” could 
be clearly heard throughout the afternoon spreading across Giza; at least 26 local 
neighborhood residents reportedly fought alongside police.303 The second, larger camp 
located outside the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque, on the other side of the city, proved to be 
a more difficult objective to clear.304 
Events at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square began as those at al-Nahda Square, with a 
wakeup call between 0600 and 0700; approximately 85,000 demonstrators emerged from 
their shelters listening to a police loudspeaker imploring them to leave peacefully, finding 
themselves surrounded by police and military units.305 Shortly after, the CSF began 
shooting tear gas and rubber bullets into the crowd; the army provided security as the 
police moved to disperse the dissident crowd and armored bulldozers maneuvered to 
clear several stone and sandbag barriers erected to defend protestors from government 
action. No one knows who fired first, but the security elements on the ground responded 
in kind; smoke and tear gas made visibility difficult and gunfire made traversing the 
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square dangerous.306 Protestors reported police snipers engaging protestors from the 
rooftops and that police fired automatic weapons into the crowd from helicopters circling 
the site and atop armored vehicles as demonstrators, and others, sought protection behind 
the nearest object.307 Witnesses reported hearing instructions on how to safely get out of 
the area via Tayaran Street, but intense gunfire made moving difficult. Medics and 
doctors treating the wounded at the Rabaa al-Adawiya medical clinic describe a period in 
the afternoon when directed fire prevented access to the facility, “live fire at the entrance 
to the medical center meant…the wounded had no safe way of getting medical help.”308 
Pro-Morsi activists were not exactly innocent of violent acts. While the vast majority 
only tried to get away from security forces, a dedicated few carried clubs, burnt tires, or 
brandished and fired guns that added to the din of gunfire in the square.309 Violence 
spread across Waraq, Kerdassa, and Giza as Islamist supporters attacked government 
buildings and security force members.310 Local residents largely supported government 
forces in this part of Cairo, too. Increasingly annoyed with the growing encampment and 
worried about their safety, a crowd gathered behind government forces cheering, “the 
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army and the people are one hand,” reminiscent of slogans from the 2011 Uprising.311 
Interior Minister Ibrahim told reporters that his men recovered, “10 machine guns, 29 
shotguns, 6 grenades…9000 rounds of ammunition…molotov cocktails…and other 
instruments of torture.”312 All told, this had been the deadliest day of violence in Egypt’s 
recent history. After the sites were cleared, Rabaa al-Adawiya took about 12 hours, 638 
people were declared dead, and 3,994 wounded.313      
4. 18 August 2013  
The government published several different stories describing the events of 18 
August 2013 illustrating how prisoners had died, alternate explanations that further 
confused and created suspicion about the situation. The group of prisoners was arrested 
when security forces cleared out the al-Fateh mosque the day prior, and joined a group of 
approximately 600 detainees traveling to Abu Zaabal prison in the northern section of 
Cairo314 Ministry of Interior spokesman Hany Abdel Latif stated that the prisoners 
attempted to escape from a police transport van and captured three officers in the attempt. 
The officers on site subdued the detainees with tear gas fired into the van, suffocating the 
men inside.315 Another news outlet stated that the MoI claimed the convicts were trying 
                                                 
 311 Kareem Fahim, “Working-Class Cairo Neighborhood Tries to Make Sense of a Brutal Day,” New 
York Times, 16 August 2013, http://nytimes.com/; Louisa Loveluck, “Egypt Clashes: ‘We Couldn’t 
Breathe’ Protestors Say as They Flee the Bloodshed,” The Telegraph, 14 August 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/; Nourhan Dakroury, “ Six Torture Cases Reported at Rabaa Sit-In: MOI,” 
Daily News Egypt, 13 August 2013, http://wwwdailynewsegytp.com/. Some resident of the area reported 
being kidnapped, shot at, tortured, and beaten by individuals associated with the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest 
site. Amnesty International was notified and released a statement on 2 August. One man commented “the 
army waited too long to attack,” another said “it was necessary.” 
 312 Rayman and Davidson, “RECAP;” “Egyptian Troops Move Against Pro-Morsi Sit-ins.”  
 313 “Egypt Authorizes Police Use of Deadly Force after Defiant Muslim Brotherhood Protesters Torch 
Government Buildings,” Fox News, 15 August 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/; Human Rights Watch, 
“Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal Force;” David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamists Debate Their Next 
Move in Tense Cairo,” New York Times, 15 August 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/; Lynch, “More than 
200 Killed.” Numbers are from the Ministry of Health despite the cabinet restricting their ability to “issue 
death tolls” on 14 August. Total “killed” includes 43 police officers reported by the Ministry of Interior.  
 314 “Egyptian Prisoners Killed in Police Custody,” Al Jazeera America, 18 August 2013, 
http://www.america.aljazeera.com/; Sam Jones and Tom McCarthy, “ Egypt: Troops Committed ‘Mass 
Unlawful Killings’, Watchdog Says – as it Happened,” The Guardian, 19 August 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/egypt-hosni-mubarak-could-be-freed-sinai-police-deaths-live. 
 315 Nourhan Dakroury, “36 Prisoners Die in an Attempt to Flee from a Police Van,” Daily News 
Egypt, 19 August 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/. The officers taken by the prisoners were beaten 
badly but released. 
 68
to escape the prison, taking one officer hostage; prisoners died as a result of tear gas and 
crowding (stampeding).316 State media claimed that security forces and “armed men” 
fought close the prison. In another report, the trucks came under attack and “detainees 
came under fire while attempting to escape,” implying they were shot, but stating that 
officers responded with gas.317 Unofficial stories from other sources made more sense, 
but remained unverifiable. The Al-Watan newspaper attributed an “unnamed police 
major” responsible for the convoy saying the prisoners rioted after being subjected to 
horrible conditions. Detainees traveled in cramped, poorly vented vans in 90 degree 
temperatures. After waiting in the vans for almost three hours, an officer opened the door 
and was accosted but subsequently rescued by a fellow officer. The prisoners were 
subdued with gas, but there was no gunfire.318 Most sources are consistent about the 
number who died and how prisoners rioted. The stories became convoluted when trying 
to determine where and under what circumstances the riot occurred .   
Clearing the sit-ins opened a flood of support for both the military and police 
forces responsible for shooting the protestors and the Muslim Brothers in the camp, a 
manifest division highlighted in polling now appeared.319 The level of violence on 14 
August spread dramatically throughout Egypt as deposed President Morsi’s supporters 
retaliated against the government’s actions, releasing the social pressure that had been 
building for months, and added an additional 173 deaths in three days. To that point, 
government forces had engaged and killed more than 30 people in three separate 
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instances, and all told, over 1000 Egyptians had died since police cleared the sit-in 
locations.320 Police forces suffered too, losing 24 officers in a “terrorist” attack on a 
police convoy in the Sinai.321 The fourth “mass killing of civilians” on 18 August was 
different; the 36 Islamists that died on that day were in police custody at the time of their 
deaths.322  
D. ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
Challengers to the regime establishment in this case failed to accomplish any of 
the Five Strategic Objectives listed earlier and were subsequently unable to elicit any 
shift in loyalty based on dissent within the security establishment.323 The military quickly 
acted when it noticed signs of dissent, mitigating any potential loyalty shifts before the 
opposition could capitalize on those shifts. Challenger leadership in 2011 employed 
tactics successfully to inspire dissent in the military, but were unable to effectively 
translate those tactics in the 2013 uprising. Traditional views merged with what 
Egyptians saw taking place, creating a narrative the Muslim Brotherhood could not 
overcome. As illustrated below, the pro-Morsi opposition failed to address the five 
strategic objectives initially and has yet to achieve its goals.  
1. Expose Regime Illegitimacy 
Legitimacy remains important and shaped the events of both phases of Egyptian 
recent history discussed in this work. In 2011, over eighteen days and with a variety of 
influences, mass mobilization, and the “hug a soldier” program conducted on a mass 
scale by a diverse group of people created “the narrative of military backing” for the 
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public when initially that narrative was very uncertain.324 Islamists had substantial 
political victories in the 2011 parliamentary election followed by a presidential election, 
with the quiet acquiescence of the SCAF along with the popular support of a country that 
saw Morsi as the “lesser of two evils,” believing him a change from his feloul opponent. 
A year later, 50 percent of Egyptians saw Mohamed Morsi’s victory as “a setback for 
Egypt.”325 The military removed the sitting president, shut down Islamist media outlets 
and jailed hundreds of Muslim Brothers, targeting senior leadership, with the support of a 
majority of Egyptians.326 With this beginning, challengers who opposed the military 
takeover in 2013 were unable to surmount the military’s popularity manifested in the 
“Cult of el-Sisi,” the legitimacy of protests versus elections, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s traditional role as a threat to the nation.327  
Much like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is arguably the most beloved 
and popular person in Egypt. He is often heard echoing the former leader’s themes and 
rhetoric and he continues to gain a following.328 A “cult of personality” has developed 
around the general, as it did around Nasser, and his military can almost do no wrong.329 
General el-Sisi has pledged to lead a stable Egypt into new elections and has made 
progress on a new constitution, easing concerns that the military will not transition to a 
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civilian government; he “has not shown himself power-hungry.”330 When, in 2013, he 
announced the military takeover to the Egyptian people, he surrounded himself with 
leading Muslim and Christian clergy, politicians such as liberal Mohamed el-Baradei, 
Galal Morra from the al Nour Party, and two prominent members of the Tamarrod (rebel) 
movement to convey the popular approval of the move, immediately establishing an 
inclusive atmosphere331. His resulting popularity has soared, overshadowing his critics 
consequences of the events described previously, even when security cleared the pro-
Morsi camps on 14 August 2013.332 His likeness adorns posters, banners, cookies, cakes, 
and chocolates; his initials “CC” are baked into pastries and molded into jewelry, 
children and sandwiches have been named after him.333 A “Sisi” inspired Tumbler 
account chronicles all the ways people have honored the General.334 He is seen by many 
as the savior and grantor of security in the country that favors security over injustice, and 
the opposition has been unable to effectively counter this popular impression of someone 
many consider a national hero that saved “the country from an ailing economy and 
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religious autocracy.”335 General el-Sisi has used his popularity to gain popular approval 
for security action; on 26 July 2013 he called on Egyptians to march in support of the 
military. In his speech he highlighted the army’s neutral position in Egypt asking for such 
a visual mandate to combat “terrorism.” Thousands marched which “was widely seen as a 
green light…to increase their repression on Islamists;” 74 people were killed.336 
Effective tactics that were implemented to remove Mubarak have had little impact on 
General el-Sisi’s wellspring of countrywide adulation. The popular reaction to the 14 
August 2013 killing of protestors has had minimal effect on his and the military’s 
popularity. In one case, a Cairo chocolatier decided to created her pro-Sisi delights after 
the camps were cleared, her “show of support” for the leader; social media sites dedicated 
to counter the appeal of General el-Sisi have failed to create a following, reiterating the 
massive popularity of the military leader and what the Muslim Brotherhood is up 
against.337  
Pro-Morsi demonstrators have centered their position on the legitimacy of the 
elections versus the legitimacy of the protests.338 Elections and democratic display are 
not unknown in Egypt, and were a common occurrence under colonial rule; there were 
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ten elections between 1922 and 1952 when President Gamal Nasser introduced a single 
party system.339 Popular legitimacy is also known from Nasser’s time where policy is 
presented to the people, “a mechanism borrowed from Gaullist France to 
legitimize…political powers” on how popular actions are with the people, the “Egyptian 
version of Bonaparteism.”340 Popular protest has been fully legitimized as an effective 
method of public voice in these last three years; major demonstrations have brought 
about three ruling party changes in as many years. Popular protest influenced military 
action to bring down President Mubarak, facilitated elections in 2012, and allowed the 
military to step in to remove President Morsi in 2013. Elections have a spotty record 
best.341  
The elections in 2011 and 2012 were freer than earlier ones, and seemed to 
progressively improve. The Presidential election of 2012 had better campaigning controls 
and enforcement than the parliamentary elections in December and January, but elections 
were unable to match the legitimacy held and conveyed by mass mobilization.342 Egypt’s 
spotted history with voting is replete with abuses because the regimes have controlled 
everything. All Egyptian political parties were licensed and monitored through the 
Political Parties Committee and subject to sanctions if they violated any rules.343 The 
Interior Ministry supervised the election process and the Ministry took proactive 
measures to maintain the existing regime. Police often “fixed” the vote by stuffing ballot 
boxes and blocking entrances to polling centers, ensuring the NDP received no less than 
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75% of the cast ballots.344 Results of post-Mubarak elections are consistently ignored by 
the SACF when there is a result the party disagrees with. On 19 March 2011, Egyptians 
voted on and approved constitutional amendments that the SCAF later disregarded, 
preferring to implement its own version of a constitution. In the December 2011 to 
January 2012 parliamentary elections, Islamists won a majority of the votes, and the 
SCAF vacated the results. The party chooses to enforce the Supreme Constitutional 
Court’s order that dissolved the unconstitutional parliament.345 President Morsi took 
office in the fourth election; the SCAF removed him after a year in response to his failed 
power grab and the largest public demonstrations in Egypt’s history.346 Finally, there was 
the constitutional referendum in December 2012 that was disregarded on 3 July 2013 in 
answer to the “will of the people.”347 
 A more legitimate tool, until democratic institutions and the electoral processes 
mature, has proved to be mobilizing a large number of people to gather in the street 
because of the danger and difficulty involved in getting people to participate. People, 
busy with their own lives, often risked imprisonment, physical abuse, injury, and death 
venturing out of their homes to participate in protests.348 The military reaction in the 
2011 Uprising removed some of the fear, making all types of people from all realms of 
life participate. The crowds on 30 June 2013 were seen as larger than those in 2011; a 
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larger crowd lends greater legitimacy.349 Public consensus for regime change provided 
opportunity for the military, at that time the most popular and trusted institution in Egypt 
and the dominating coercive power to remove the elected president form power. In the 
Presidential Election of 2012, non-Islamist Egyptians gave Mr. Morsi the “benefit of the 
doubt” believing him a better option than his feloul opponent, yet, in time, he lost popular 
approval.350 When the military acted to remove President Morsi, it was acknowledged by 
a majority of the population to be acting on the people’s behalf, and the military has not 
lost that support.351  
 The final hurdle hindering the opposition from delegitimizing the government 
was that the Muslim Brotherhood was understood and referred to in terms of a threat. The 
current challenger is largely made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist 
organization that has contested Egyptian regimes, sometimes violently, for the past eighty 
years and represents those in the population hostile to the state.352 The Muslim 
Brotherhood is a tenacious group that has survived years of torment in Egypt since its 
founding in 1928. Originally a social association, the Muslim Brotherhood grew into a 
civil society organization that offered basic services, and later addressed politics; they 
built an immense grass roots network.353 This organized network current actions have not 
helped its popularity among the rest of the population. A doctor and MB supporter in Port 
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Said commented, “It is very hard to be walking down the street to buy groceries and hear 
passerby’s saying things like ‘we will clean Port Said of the Muslim Brotherhood.’”354 
There is a long history of animosity between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
security forces beginning with Brotherhood’s support of the 1952 coup.355 Two years 
later a man named Mahoud Abdel Latif of the Muslim Brotherhood, shot at President 
Nasser; in 1981, Islamists succeeded in killing President Sadat.356 The 2013 government 
actions mirror those of Nasser’s time including massive roundups, arrests, and 
incarceration of Brotherhood members.357 While adhering to a policy of formal state 
support before the military removed the president, after the events of 3 July 2013, 
military representatives and state and independent media outlets call MB members 
“‘terrorists who seek to destroy Egypt.”358 This narrative and terminology has spread into 
the popular vernacular creating a further frame of threat attached to the Brotherhood. In 
the aftermath of the security clearance operations, Amira Said Aghoul commented “The 
Muslim Brotherhood is a gang that is controlling Egypt,” and the violence was their fault 
and “I thank God and General Sisi for getting rid of them.”359 An Imbaba resident said 
that people that died on 14 August did not matter to him, “It’s about the security of the 
country.” Another resident simply said, “It [security clearing the camps] was necessary;” 
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elsewhere in the streets people openly praised the army for clearing the streets.360 The 
head of the Tamarrod, a popular Egyptian youth movement stated, “the Muslim 
Brotherhood says they’ll burn Egypt if they don’t get what they want” and Brotherhood 
members around the country have lived up to that.361 The response of MB adherents has 
been to burn a number of police stations, buildings, cars, and specifically to lash out at 
Christians. Participants were heard calling for Egypt to become an “Islamic state,” and  
30 churches have been attacked and burned.362 Members have been abiding to the 
Muslim Brotherhood motto “‘Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran 
is our law; Jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.’”363 
2. Establish Challenger Legitimacy 
Challengers to the 2013 regime lost their legitimacy during the presidency of 
Mohamed Morsi and failed to regain it once the military took over.364 The inability of the 
elected Islamists to pull Egypt out of its economic morass, admittedly a difficult task for 
any group, was compounded by Islamist failure to include other groups in the political 
process and therefore ostracized a portion of the electorate. In the parliamentary elections 
of 2011, Islamist parties were overwhelmingly elected; the Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP) and the Nour Party received a combined 61 percent of the vote from the 62 percent 
of registered voters that participated in parliamentary elections; the FJP received 51.7 
percent of the vote in a presidential election where approximately 51 percent of the 
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registered voters turned out.365 Those elections were close, and in Mohamed Morsi’s 
first remarks he spoke of inclusion: “We believe in the importance of the new Egyptian 
government upholding universal values, and respecting the rights of all Egyptian citizens 
— including women and religious minorities such as Coptic Christians,” but he failed to 
live up to that promise.366  
Shortly after the election, the President recalled an Islamist dominated parliament 
which had been dissolved days before the presidential runoffs by a judicial order 
enforced by the SCAF.367 A militant attack on a security checkpoint had allowed Mr. 
Morsi to retire several senior military leaders, allowing him to place Islamist 
sympathizers in their roles, and removed the SCAF’s self-given constitutional powers 
granted before the elections.368 Over the year he centralized power in the executive 
branch, launched investigations on numerous critics, fractured a nation along largely 
sectarian lines, favored an Islamist agenda, sought to limit democracy, and forced an 
Islamist constitution on a population where 63 percent of those polled opposed it.369 
Though Morsi’s political moves may have been a ploy to gain support, the public inferred 
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them an Islamist plot. Anti-Morsi demonstrations began in August 2012 as Egyptians 
begin to wonder about an Islamist takeover; suspicion was confirmed in November when 
protests really began.370 Meanwhile, little improved in Egypt; the economy remained 
largely dependent on foreign support, there was no improvement in unemployment, and 
basic services were becoming more expensive. “[Morsi] failed to honor every one of the 
promises he made in order to be elected. He…behaved as though he had somehow 
legitimately inherited the old Mubarak Regime with a veneer of piety.”371 Increased 
violence, sectarian and non-sectarian, combined with a general lawlessness that deterred 
business interests and investment; collateral damage from the violence destroyed the 
existing economic capabilities.372 Islamist parties performed well in elections so 
Mohamed Morsi and his party took that as a mandate by the public that the people 
wanted an Islamist regime in charge. When the people realized his intent, as state security 
went down, they knew from the last years’ experience that the MB did not and could not 
deliver. This realization had a direct impact on the people’s need for a legitimate 
alternative to the regime. 
The primary strength in the Muslim Brotherhood lay in numbers and its ability to 
mobilize, as “thousands of people clustered” in support of Mohammed Morsi on 1 
August.373 The membership selection process for the Muslim Brotherhood, designed to 
deter security force infiltrators, created a cadre of dedicated members; there was an 
estimated 600,000 members that the Brotherhood was able to mobilize with a phone call 
and this translated into results in the electoral process.374 This base of guaranteed support 
could be called upon to motivate support. The civic arm of the MB helps provide basic 
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services: education, food, and health services, to hundreds of thousands of people. 
Providing these services creates a bond with the population, and with Brotherhood 
members in the daily lives of the people it helps.375 As political involvement became 
easier, the civic arm was used to influence voter turnout and candidate selection, arguably 
bribing Egyptian voters.376 These factors coalesced in a dedicated center that could 
mobilize quickly. The tactic of mobilizing into large crowds to dissuade the military from 
their actions was based on the previous successes when the leading elements in Egypt 
changed predominantly with violence coming from the CSF. Participants believed that 
the military would not fire on the crowds. The pro-military crowds, centered in Tahrir 
Square were larger, and while the military did not want to take over, it did.377 Protestors 
spent approximately six weeks in the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares and only 
garnered disdain from the local residents and ultimately hostile fire from security forces 
that saw the Islamists as a threat. The large crowds failed to intimidate the security 
services that viewed the throngs of people as enemies of the state that needed to be 
expunged.  
Inability of the MB to effectively gain a more popular following outside of the 
organization has also been impacted by state media bias. Islamist stations and media 
outlets were censored within 24 hours of the takeover and the remaining independent 
stations and papers returned to the policies of previous military regimes; the Islamist 
voice had been silenced.378 The MB affiliated personnel President Morsi placed in office 
have been removed and the “free media” that followed the 2011 uprising has largely 
returned to its former ways of supporting the state. Traditionally, media outlets in Egypt 
reinforced the supremacy of the state with varying degrees of government intervention 
that minimized political discourse.379 Over time, efforts to maintain the appearance of 
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democracy and concessions have forced openings in formally controlled spaces that 
allowed media outlets greater freedom of discourse. The rapid expansion of technological 
capacity in Egypt in the last ten years created a regional leader in Internet usage and 
technology and a reported 20 and 28 percent of Egyptians online in 2011, and 86.5 
percent of Egyptians with cell phones.380 Since the 2011 Uprising, private individuals 
have blogged and submitted their own commentary, but the Interior Ministry SSIS, 
turned NSA, exists and jails offenders of the emergency laws.381 Generals within the 
Ministry of Defense voiced concern over the effects of a free press on Egyptian society’s 
view of the military; there are 25 owners of media outlets in Egypt. In a released video 
clip a SCAF general says, ““we have been concerned with controlling the media… we 
are yet to achieve what we want,” implying that the military government is working 
toward a modified version of state control.382  
Efforts to control the foreign media have returned Egypt to a security state model. 
Turkish reporters Metin Turan and Abdhllah Shami were “arrested” in mid-August 2013 
and have yet to be released; a female correspondent Hibe Zekeriya captured with Mr. 
Turan was released eight hours later. In a similar incident France 2 had a crew of four 
arrested and held for 10 hours on August while Jared Malsin, who works for Time 
Magazine and freelance photographer Cliff Cheney were subjected to “violence and 
intimidation” on 16 August.383 In a statement from the official foreign press coordination 
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center, “Egypt is feeling severe bitterness towards some Western media coverage that is 
biased to the Muslim Brotherhood and ignores shedding light on violent and terror acts 
that are perpetrated by this group in the form of intimidation operations and terrorizing 
citizens.”384 In another instance, however, two Wall Street Journal reporters were 
attacked by mobs and rescued by soldiers; one reporter commented, “Today, I feel like 
the army and I are very much on one hand.”385 Media has been allowed greater openness, 
but state control and sanctions still exist, and a majority of the independent outlets and all 
of the state media now maintain a “party line” that is popular with their audience and 
conveniently keeps them open in the state’s good graces.  
3. Raise Costs of Repression  
Within 24 hours the military led government had reduced the opposition voice in 
Egyptian society significantly; arrest warrants for 200 Islamists were issued, including 
Mohamed Badie and his deputy Rashad Bayoumi, four Islamist TV stations were 
shuttered, Al Jazeera, Mubasher Misr, Muslim Brotherhood owned EGYPT-25, and 
Islamist run Al-Hafiz and Al-Nas, while state media controls reestablished almost 
overnight.386 The state intervention of numerous media outlets severely restricted the 
mass distribution of the opposition narrative. The media highlighted opposition action 
while it ignored or reshaped the context of negative government activity thereby 
increasing negative perceptions of the opposition. As time progressed, the popularity of 
military intervention increased largely because people were not exposed to political 
alternatives, combined with the inept governance under the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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The rhetoric the Muslim Brotherhood has used throughout the period was 
indicative of a hostile organization that was unwilling to work with others. In President 
Morsi’s speech of 2 July, he warned of violence if his legitimacy was not guaranteed.387 
Brotherhood spokesman Gehad el Haddad stated that the MB would not work with the 
post-Morsi leadership, the implication of such an action would grant default legitimacy to 
the military action.388 He continued later “At this point it’s a zero-sum game: it’s either 
the Brotherhood or the old regime. Everyone else is too small to matter.”389 Sentiment 
echoed in the streets, “What the army did, they have unleashed hell on Egypt.”390 
Protestors chanted: “Wake up, don’t be afraid, the army must leave!,” “The Interior 
Ministry are thugs!” and “Egypt is Islamic, not secular!”391 In the Siani, a crowd chanted, 
“No more election after today.”392 The repeated sentiment reinforced the narrative of 
threat created by the military regime and reinforced by the state media: “the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a threat to the stability of the nation, a threat the military has dealt with 
before; the military can give you the stability you want.”  
Symbols are often used to galvanized and unite a population of mobilization. In 
2013, the symbol of a raised hand with four fingers extended and a bent thumb crossing 
the palm has become a symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood—not the Islamist movement 
“R4bia” as intended. “R4bia” references the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque and government 
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clearing the sit-in located there.393 The first use was reported in Turkey; soon after 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used it in support of Islamist protestors, 
providing a boost to its worldwide popularity. The issue here is again, inclusion, an 
attribute not demonstrated in the Morsi presidency or by his supporters in the streets that 
speak and in some cases act in violence.394 Islamists and supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood are the primary users of this symbol limiting any value the symbol has to 
unite a diverse population. Attempts to refocus the R4bia sign’s narrative toward anti-
authoritarian tactics have not taken hold; the R4bia sign would then be a much more 
effective confederate symbol.395 The opposition of 2013 has yet to create a broad based 
appeal that the 2011 protests so effectively generated. 
Pro-Morsi protestors inconsistent use of nonviolence provides a reason for using 
more and more repressive methods of crowd control and dispersal. Months before Mr. 
Morsi left office, pro and anti-Morsi protestors had been fighting in the streets. An 
Islamist protest outside the Egyptian Supreme Court in April degraded into violence as 
each side threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. Islamists set fire to buses and at least 39 
people were injured.396 In May 2013, Friday prayers released thousands that marched to 
Tahrir, fights erupted as pro and anti Morsi demonstrators voiced their opinions. “The 
people and the army are one hand,” was heard provoking those that did not want military 
intervention.397 On 1 July 2013, a clash between protestors killed seven and wounded 
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more than 600 across Egypt398 As 3 July came and went, pro-Morsi supporters camped 
around the mosques and the anti-Morsi protestors held Tahrir Square, a symbol in itself, 
and events narrowed to the protest camps at the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda square. 
The protestors continued defiance of calls to disperse. The heated rhetoric, combined 
with the violence conducted by MB members maintained the group’s role of antagonist 
and justified hostile actions taken by security forces on the ground that are conditioned to 
defeat the protestors.399 After the clearance operation, running battles across Cairo, Giza, 
and Alexandria reconfirmed the violent threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and an 
additional 173 were reported dead.400 The repression used on 14 August seemed to have 
worked as subsequent protests had a lower number of participants and stayed out of 
central Cairo.401 General el-Sisi and the military government maintain they were acting 
on “the will of the people” and “could not ignore the widespread protests against Morsi’s 
rule.”402 The general is seen by many as the savior and grantor of security in the country 
that favors security over injustice.403 The violence witnessed by the men on the ground in 
the days and months prior to the heavy handed incidents eliminated any hesitation and 
justified to the soldiers and public the necessity to clear the Islamists. The security 
services were praised for the action.  
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4. Reduce Costs of Accommodation  
After securing Morsi, General el-Sisi asserted the legitimacy of the security 
establishment by stressing a theme of protecting the nation and following the will of the 
people, “The army and police right now are the guardians of the will of the people” while 
maintaining “there is room for everyone.”404 Framing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat 
resounded well in the security forces which held the role of defender of the state; the 
threat frame was consistently reinforced by the scenes of increasing violence and 
bloodshed in the days leading up to a the incidents of the mass killings.405 Security and 
stability needed to be established and who better to do that than the defender of the state? 
The security establishment moved slowly using consistent delays and pronouncements to 
conduct operations “within the law and constitution” before clearing the camps. 
Additional time allowed Egyptians to infer that security crackdowns were not unilateral 
actions conducted by a hostile police state; demonstrators knew they were coming and 
had time to get out.406 A theme of “the government is simply doing what it takes to 
restore security” resounds well for many Egyptians, and keeps security forces in a 
positive light.407 
Traditional methods of securing long term loyalty were reestablished as the 
military resurgence took hold. During President Morsi’s term he appointed 17 regional 
governors, seven of whom were from the MB, increasing the total number of MB 
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governors to 11 out of 27.408 The tactic was a method Gamal Nasser used as a method of 
consolidating power upon taking over. Anwar Sadat used the same tactic to remove 
potential rivals and it eventually became a way of co-opting the loyalty of senior 
leaders.409 President Mansour, upon assuming office, appointed a total of 25 governors, 
replacing all MB and Islamist affiliated governors with loyal judges and generals, in 
some cases known for their more coercive approach to dealing with protestors.410 The 
generals have more benefits staying with the military, and soldiers find little desire and 
motivation in actively defying the secular institution in favor of an Islamist organization 
it has been fighting for years. Morsi chose to side with Islamists instead of the people 
who called the military. 
General el Sisi and the Egyptian military are the dominant political force in Egypt 
and throughout the post-Mubarak period the military has worked to retain the 
independence and power it gained, going so far as to codify its separation and special 
benefits in the new constitution. Of significant impact is the Egyptian military industrial 
complex, a wide economic entity that touches nearly every sector of the Egyptian 
economy and gives the military an additional method to insert itself into various Egyptian 
collectives and tribal networks. As one of the largest employers in the country, the pools 
of people who are tied to and sympathize with the military encompass a significant 
number of Egyptians whose livelihood and welfare depended on it as one time or another. 
The work product of this enterprise is vast. It is responsible for building Jeep brand 
vehicles, basic sustenance items, clothing, military equipment, as well as controlling 
some of the most valuable land in the country. While the actual numbers are a state 
secret, some estimate the military industrial complex constitutes 10–15% of the Egyptian 
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economy.411 Money created by these endeavors allows a better livelihood for soldiers and 
access into the formal political sphere; there are plenty of loyal workers, soldiers, and 
money to reinforce the military’s presence in politics. This economic independence 
provides privilege and status to elements within the military that have a greater impact on 
or influence over security service loyalty.  
Security members, specifically the officers, wish to preserve their privileged 
status within Egyptian society. Within days of being sworn in, Mr. Morsi and the military 
establishment escalated their struggle for power. The military sought to maintain its 
autonomy from civilian interference while President Morsi maneuvered for civilian 
control of an Islamist state.412 Maintaining loyalty to the security establishment ensures 
the access to privileges to which the elements within the organization have grown 
accustomed including, hospitals, social clubs, homes, children’s schools, vacations, and 
food centers. Senior leaders comment that it is the military’s responsibility to protect its 
members from the “caprice of market forces,” and that the military is “duty bound to 
provide…a decent living.” 413 Police officials are not unaccustomed to special privileges 
either.414 A force to be reckoned with, according to Robert Springborg, “besides the 
Brotherhood, they are the only real cohesive institution in the country.”415 
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5. Demonstrate Likelihood of Success 
Nothing the pro-Morsi activists did led security personnel to believe they were 
going to succeed. For each of the thousands of people that took to the streets in support of 
President Morsi there was a matching crowd, some would argue larger, that was 
protesting against him.416 Tahrir Square (Liberation Square in Arabic), the very symbol 
of Egyptian liberty, reminiscent of the successful protests of 2011, was occupied by the 
anti-Morsi demonstrators, despite numerous attempts to alter that.417 Soldiers, police, and 
civilians alike heard comments in the media and on the street classifying the MB as 
terrorists. Amal, a civil servant in Al-Ittihadiya said, “I think that the Muslim 
Brotherhood are terrorists; I did not used to think of them this way but now I do;” she 
continues that she believes the Brotherhood’s threat to “burn the country” and calls for 
General el-Sisi to “eradicate the terrorists.”418 When General el-Sisi announced that 
President Morsi had been removed he was flanked by senior members from Al- Azhar, 
the Coptic priesthood, the Nour Party, liberals and the Tamarrod, highlighting to all the 
inclusive nature and unity of the military’s action.419 When General Sisi asked for 
“honest Egyptians to take to the streets…to reveal their will and authorize the army and 
police...” people came by the thousands.420 The continued popularity of el-Sisi, the 
representative of the military, in the streets, is a vivid reminder that the military is in 
charge and will win. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This paper defines success in terms of a shift in regime; President Mubarak was 
removed and President Mansour, supported by the military, remains in power according 
to the demands of the people.421 In 2011, Egypt’s anti-government opposition was able to 
capitalize on the mistakes of Mr. Mubarak’s regime to mobilize millions of people onto 
the streets. Once in Tahrir, activists simply had to wear down the CSF and maintain an 
all-inclusive, nonviolent presence in the physical space. In 2013, Egypt’s opposition is 
easier to define and the majority of opposition participants identifies with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and an Islamist lifestyle or belief structure.422 By self-identifying, the 2013 
opposition casts itself in a preconceived light, known well to fellow Egyptians. This 
interferes with creating a greater support base from those outside the Brotherhood. The 
violence that is attributed to members of the 2013 opposition further separates 
challengers from greater support within the Egyptian population. Opposition in the first 
case was able to accomplish each of the objectives in Anika Binnendijk’s Strategic 
Framework, by highlighting regime illegitimacy, legitimizing the opposition, increasing 
personnel costs to repression, making it easier to shift, and demonstrating success of the 
movement which increased the likelihood of security force loyalty shifts that occurred. In 
the second case, the Muslim Brotherhood’s self-reliance and inability to incorporate a 
greater diversity of Egyptians, which would have diluted the perception of threat created 
by the state media and reinforced by interaction on the street, ensured security forces had 
no hesitation dealing with a threat to the state they are trained to defeat.423  
 Over the 30 years of President Mubarak’s reign, the regime largely illegitimated 
itself, economic reforms alienated the public, opposition party voice in government was 
pushed out, and efforts by the political elite to place Gamal Mubarak on a throne further 
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alienated the population and concerned the military.424 In 2011, opposition activists 
presented themselves as peaceful Egyptians fighting for what is right by carrying 
Egyptian flags, singing patriotic songs, using basic slogans of political and economic 
change, and ingratiating appeals to the military. Youth groups came together online 
highlighting the injustice that was amplified by Khalid Said’s death at the hands of 
police; he gave injustice a face that all Egyptians could identify with. The government 
believed in repressive tactics that had worked for decades, and thought those tactics 
would continue to be effective. The opposition movement’s tactic of maintaining a 
nonviolent disposition, even under the most stressful periods, highlighted the illegitimacy 
of repressive acts. While state media ignored the first days, media outlets that covered 
that time presented images of peaceful Egyptians walking for legitimate reasons, being 
beaten by the state; devout people easy to identify with.425 
President Morsi was the face of a Muslim Brotherhood in power. In his year in 
office, the country’s economic growth remained low, debt increased, unemployment 
grew, the Egyptian pound decreased in value which made everything cost more; 
shortages on fuel and electricity swept the country and the bread subsidization program 
enacted to curb smuggling was ineffective.426 Journalist Sarah Lynch of USA Today 
summarizes: 
In late June, millions of people protested what they said was a hijacking of 
their new democracy by Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed 
Morsi, the first freely elected president of Egypt who had given himself 
sweeping powers over the judiciary, launched investigations against his 
critics and sought to regulate pro-democracy groups. Morsi’s opponents 
accused him of forcing an Islamist constitution on the people, pushing a 
religious agenda and ignoring the crumbling economy. Crime rates had 
risen under Morsi and militant attacks on government outposts persisted in 
the restive Sinai Peninsula.427 
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Morsi’s lack of popularity followed his supporters on the streets and into the camps at 
Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares. Residents in the neighborhoods around the 
camps grew annoyed at Morsi supporters, and reports of kidnapping and torture in Rabaa 
al-Adawiya only strengthened the argument that participants were terrorists.428 Violence 
and chaos seemed to accompany the MB members wherever they went, destabilizing the 
country. Creating legitimacy through crowds, exceedingly large numbers of people 
gathered around Egypt calling for Mr. Morsi’s removal. On 26 July General el-Sisi, the 
face of the military, asked for a similar gathering of people to support military action 
against terrorists and got it.429  
Kefaya! opened the eyes of protest leaders and the 6 April textile strike gave them 
hope of success. Youth groups built an online presence, forming networks of supporters. 
Khalid Said’s death presented an opportunity to protest the ills of corruption and vice by 
silent protest. Hundreds and then thousands stood apart in silence, visibly supporting each 
other without giving authority reason to arrest or harass. Hundreds of thousands joined 
online sites, and these supporters could have been anyone. When the 25 January protest 
took place, organizers were surprised at the turnout. 430 A protestor commented, “From 
the very first day we felt we could win because of the huge numbers of people 
involved.”431 The crowds in Tahrir and the other squares around the country began to 
legitimize themselves. Al Jazeera showed clips of the abuse these crowds suffered at the 
hands of thugs and police. Multiple thousands of people, an estimated 20 percent of 
Egypt, participated in this uprising; the sheer diversity of the participants was 
staggering.432 The longer the crowds were in the square, the more people came, and when 
the unions and professional groups began to strike, success was assured.433 
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The Brotherhood is one of the two most organized and stable institutions in the 
country, the other is the military, and the military used its considerable numbers to 
mobilize consecutive political victories.434 The authoritarian structure, with a rigid chain 
of command, disaffected a significant portion of the post-Mubarak population.435 The 
MB’s political success has not effectively translated to broad based street support among 
minorities and liberals. The rhetoric that flowed throughout the country in the weeks prior 
to 14 August was framed around the legitimacy of a leader by election versus those in the 
public square and further simplified pro- and anti-Morsi. By comparison, the anti-
Mubarak protests of 2011 were synonymous with anti-authoritarian policy and 
corruption. By focusing the argument so narrowly, challengers automatically limited their 
potential support population to a specific segment and gave the people an easy decision, 
“do I like Morsi or not?” As pro- and anti-Morsi protestors clashed, perceptions of a 
“terrorist” threat further were reinforced by a resurgent state media; who instigated the 
violence was less a factor than maintaining the state theme.436 Egyptians turned to the 
only institution seen as capable of securing the state. The military learned from the 
mismanagement of the post-Mubarak SCAF and may have not wanted to come out of the 
barracks. However, once there, they saw a public willingly supporting domestic security 
policy that focused on crushing an old nemesis.  
Repressive costs were elevated by the Mubarak regime opening, however slowly, 
public political discourse and technology. Throughout the 1990s, the regime wanted to 
play at democracy and loosened its restrictions on media so new private stations and 
papers were established. While they may have been difficult to run, there was more room 
for discussion. Television that was not subject to state censoring was more available so a 
different perspective was discussed.437 Internet and cell phone usage grew and protestors 
were able to increase personal costs of repressors through various websites. Finally, Al 
Jazeera coverage showed the world, both inside and outside of Egypt, the true nature of 
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the regime. External actor influence is difficult to judge, but military consideration of 
U.S. desires for the military not to attack civilians was certainly a consideration; the 
effects of a U.S. decision to cut military aid to Egypt would have been a factor in any 
decision.438 
Days before President Morsi was taken into military custody, crowds gathered in 
squares throughout the country in numbers argued larger than those two and a half years 
prior asking for it to happen. On the stage General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was flanked by 
“Egypt’s top Muslim and Christian clerics…political leaders including Mohamed 
ElBaradei, the Nobel Prize winning diplomat and liberal icon, and Galal Morra, a 
prominent Islamist ultraconservative…all of whom endorsed the takeover.”439 He 
declared, “The Egyptian Armed Forces…stands distant from political forces, and “has 
been called by the Egyptian people for help;” the military, justified as “by the will of the 
people,” removed the elected president.440 On 26 July 2013, before much of the security 
force crackdown occurred, el-Sisi asked for the people’s support again. The repressive 
measures taken were seen as approved prior to execution; between 30 June to 30 August 
2013, security forces encountered little domestic backlash that would hinder future 
repressive measures against the pro-Morsi demonstrators. Signs of a coalescing “anti-
authoritarian tactics” movement were reported, and any movement formed around this 
had broader appeal and increased the potential feedback from future use of coercive 
tactics.441  
The opposition to Mubarak in 2011 did not succeed by itself, but the actions of 
demonstrators allowed the regime to be its own worst enemy. Events outside of 
demonstrator control lead to the military decision to remove President Mubarak, 
acquiescing to the massive crowds demands.442 The primary task the demonstrators 
needed to accomplish was to mobilize large numbers to face security forces, voice the 
                                                 
438 Bumiller, “Divided Military.”  
439 “Army Ousts Egypt’s President.” 
440 “Egypt’s ‘Full Military Coup:’ How It Happened,” RT, 3 July 2013, http://rt.com/. 
441 Kirkpatrick and Fahim, “Signs of a Shift Among Egyptian Protesters.” 
442 Spencer, “Battle of the Nile;” “Egyptians Denounce Mubarak.” 
 96
crimes of the regime, and respond to security tactics in a nonviolent manner. The growing 
crowds of protestors forced open a public spaces (central squares). Their tactics, multiple 
start points, starting in poorer sections of town with narrow streets to gather numbers, and 
starting after midday prayers helped mobilize the population. The violent repressive state 
reaction by the CSF was expected and fought off for four days throughout the country; 
the variable was the military. Activist targeted the rank-and-file of the military because 
they knew they would have a higher likelihood of success. Any protest success is 
predicated on the primary coercive institution’s desire to repress.443   
The purpose of the Egyptian military is to support the regime, and it did that, 
initially.444 It responded to the president’s call to deploy, reinforced battered riot police, 
resupplied police units with ammunition along with reports of soldiers shooting 
protestors.445 On 2 February, they watched as men on horses and camels charged crowds, 
thugs attacked, and sniper shots and rocks from rooftops rained down. These actions were 
not universally practiced throughout Egypt over those eighteen days. A greater number of 
reports highlight the soldiers’ positive interaction with the crowds. The “hug a soldier” 
efforts of inclusion helped soldiers identify with the crowd and when the order came to 
shoot, military commanders on the ground disobeyed.446 There was a clear divide in the 
actions of soldiers that eventually reached the senior leadership, and changed a regime.  
This divide was less prominent in 2013; the Muslim Brotherhood had been 
characterized as a threat to the state by generations of soldiers and officers throughout the 
security forces. The homogeneous nature of the opposition ensured that the security force 
element would not, or had a reduced likelihood to, injure an Egyptian. The opposition 
was not made of Egyptians; the opposition were terrorists that needed to be eradicated.447 
The failing of the opposition was the inability to combine disparate groups of people 
under a banner appealing to all. President Morsi understood the victories at the polls as a 
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mandate from the people of Egypt to bring religion into the rule of the country, and while 
a number of Egyptians wanted Egypt’s laws to follow a strict interpretation of the Quran, 
a significant minority does not.448 A year after the election, more than two years since 
President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, the goals of the Arab Spring had still not been 
reached; Morsi had gone too far, too fast, seemingly taking away the voice of the people, 
as did those who ruled before. His supporters, likewise, failed to develop a popular 
platform to include a greater percentage of the population. Stability degraded as violence 
spread, police were attacked in the Sinai reiterating the threat the MB posed. As long as 
the military continues its trajectory, securing the nation and progressing toward a 
transition to a civilian state led by a civilian government, it will maintain its popularity 
and power. “The most important thing from the military’s perspective is preserving its 
place as the locus of power and influence in the system.”449 
A. ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
Although Binnendijk’s framework provides an excellent tool to evaluate the 
success or potential for success of a nonviolent revolution, the thesis author suggests 
adding “International Support” to the framework. Even though the support of a foreign 
actor  [a state actor, government organization (GO), or non-government organization 
(NGO)] is not required for regime change it is a potentially significant addition to the 
challenger toolbox. In the two examples specified in this work, the opposition in 2011 
incorporated a broad base of foreign actors, from various GOs, NGOs, and some states, 
whereas regime challengers of 2013 limited their overall exposure to foreign influences 
and had less foreign support from a narrower group. 
Establishing and maintaining NGOs in Egypt has always been managed by the 
state and been a difficult process; Law 32 of 1964, governing civil associations has been 
a tool used to deny legal standing of any NGOs the state finds threatening. Political 
parties had to distinguish themselves from others, be unconnected to foreign influences, 
and not conflict with “national unity, or public order,” enforced by the interpretation of 
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the political parties’ committee; all to isolate to prevent any idea of political change from 
entering the dialog of the population.450 The opposition to Mubarak’s regime skirted 
constitutional and legal difficulties by going to the NGOs. In 2008, Muhammad Adel, a 
senior leader in the April 6 Movement trained in Belgrade for a week under the tutelage 
of an OPTOR NGO known as the Center for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies 
(CANVAS), learning the tactics that effectively brought down Slobodan Milošević in 
2000.451 American GOs, such as the International Republican Institute and National 
Democratic Institute promote democracy around the world and helped set up and fund 
some of these training opportunities.452 The European Union (EU) had similar policies 
laid out in their Action Plan of 2004. Saudia Arabia condemned the protestors.453 Some 
NGO’s like Freedom House and the Project on Middle East Democracy similarly funded 
travel and classroom instruction in non-violent protest, networking skill training.454 
Online, Tunisian bloggers posted tactics to help the Egyptian movement. The success of 
the Tunisian Revolution gave hope that change could happen in Egypt. Even with the 
dwindling influence of the United Sates, opinions of President Obama and Secretary of 
State Clinton were weighed in the Egyptian military decision making at senior levels; this 
was done even though the decision to remove President Mubarak was based largely on a 
cost benefit analysis.455  
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Much like the lack of broad based support displayed in their street 
demonstrations, the MB protestors in 2013 largely stuck to their own experiences and the 
tactics they had learned over their long history. In 2011, a rift developed between young 
and old members; the Muslim Brotherhood youth wanted to join the protests while the 
leadership decided not to. Later in the protests, the MB allowed the youth to participate, 
but the organization stayed out. The Muslim Brotherhood did not come out in support of 
the anti-Mubarak demonstrations until 28 January 2011—three days after the protests 
started.456 While there has been little evidence uncovered of foreign support for the MB 
during this time, state support for the military government is prevalent. The military-
backed government received atypical praise and a “blank check” from Saudi Arabia 
which pledged to “shower it with money as needed,” as the United States and EU 
considered aid reductions.457  
While the impact of foreign intervention, destabilizing factors such as monetary 
support, direct intervention, training, and the intent of action could be placed in other 
categories, the true implications and significance on the overall movement warrants a 
more directed categorization for study and inclusion in this framework .  
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